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Scholarshipon the administrativeprocess has scarcely attended to the
role that states play in federal regulation. This Article argues that it is time
for that to change. An emerging, important new strand of federalism
scholarship, known as "administrativefederalism," now seeks to safeguard
state interests in the administrativeprocess and argues that federal agencies
should consider state input when developing regulations. These ideas appear
to be gaining traction in practice. States now possess privileged access to
agency decisionmaking processes through a variety of formal and informal
channels. And some courts have signaled support for the idea of a special state
role in federal agency decisionmaking.
These developments have important implications for administrative
law and theory. In particular, they bear on the paramount question of
administrative legitimacy-the decades-long effort to justify the exercise of
lawmaking power by unelected administrators in our constitutional
democracy. A robust state role in the administrative process, this Article
shows, is in tension with the models of legitimacy that have come to serve as
administrative law's North Star. Whereas the two reigning legitimacy models
alternativelyprize (1) centralized presidentialcontrol to ensure responsiveness
to majority preferences, and (2) apolitical application of expertise, state input
raises the specter of regional factionalism and home-state politics. Two types
of solutions could alleviate this tension: reforming state involvement in the
regulatory process, or updating legitimacy models. The Article concludes by
charting both courses-identifying potential reforms and sketching
possibilitiesfor a new understandingof administrative legitimacy that would
better accommodate the state role.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The perennial struggle for control of the administrative statewhich "wields vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily
life"'-has now captured the attention of federalism scholars. An
important, emerging literature on "administrative federalism" argues
that federal agencies should consider state input when making
regulatory decisions. This literature seeks, in relevant part, to protect
states from federal overreaching by giving them special access to
agency decisionmaking: scholars in the field urge that agencies should
treat states as regulatory partners and suggest that courts should
limit deference where agencies fail to collaborate with states.2 Federal
politicians, too, embrace the notion that agencies should work closely
with states, and state officials clamor to expand their own
involvement.
Scholars of the administrative process, however, have scarcely
studied the state role in federal regulation. States, that is, have never
been considered part of the main cast of characters that shape federal
agencies' decisions on the front end-namely, the President,
Congress, the courts, interest groups, and administrators themselves.3
Accordingly, scholars have not considered the implications of state
involvement for what is perhaps the central question in
administrative law: whether agency action is legitimate, particularly
in light of the broad powers exercised by unelected administrators. 4

1. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3156 (2010); see also id. at 3168 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (describing the scope of modern regulatory power).
2. See infra Part II.A.
3.
See, e.g., CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCoTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING 193-268 (2011)
(describing participation by business groups and citizen organizations in the rulemaking process,
as well as oversight by the President, Congress, and the courts); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246 (2001) ("The history of the American

administrative state is the history of competition among different entities for control of its
policies. All three branches of government-the President, Congress, and Judiciary-have
participated in this competition; so too have the external constituencies and internal staff of the
agencies."); Cass R. Sunstein, Participation,Public Law, and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. REV.
976, 976 (1982) (describing efforts by "all three branches of the federal government" to "discipline
and police the exercise of discretion by federal agencies").
See JAMES FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 31-57 (1978) (describing the crisis of
4.
public ambivalence towards agency action). As one of Freedman's reviewers observed, "so
constant has been the sense of crisis attending the agencies that the problem probably
transcends the specific concerns that successive generations have voiced." William H. Allen, The
Administrative Process: Which Crisis?, 32 STAN. L. REV. 207, 208 (1979). Though the contours of
the legitimacy dilemma have varied, the concerns continue to receive extensive attention. See,

e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 987 (1997) ("Like an intriguing but awkward family heirloom, the
legitimacy problem is handed down from generation to generation of administrative law
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Whereas studies of legitimacy have "explore[d] the optimal allocation
of oversight authority" among Congress, the President, and the
courts,5 as well as the appropriate participatory role of administrators,
interest groups, and members of the public,6 they have not yet
considered the descriptive or theoretical facets of a state role in the
federal administrative process.
This Article begins to take up that sizeable task. As a
descriptive matter, the Article shows that the ideas fueling the
administrative federalism literature appear to have traction in
practice. Statutes, executive orders, and formal agreements now afford
states privileged access to federal agency decisionmaking. States also
regularly consult with agencies through myriad informal and largely
opaque channels, due in large part to the interdependence between
many federal regulatory programs and state government. And while
access does not equal influence, there are reasons to believe the
federalism scholars who have described this state role as influential.
Such reasons include the cultural ties between state and federal
administrators; federal agencies' dependence on state cooperation; the
political salience of state concerns, which triggers the sensitivity of
federal agencies' elected principals; and the threat of judicial review.
Indeed, some judicial opinions seem to encourage a special state role
in the federal regulatory process.7
This descriptive account paves the way for the Article's core
analytic inquiry: how the participation of states in federal agency
decisionmaking affects administrative legitimacy. Whereas the
administrative federalists ask what administrative law can do for
scholars."); Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 19-26 (2001) (describing
demands for administrative legitimacy); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for
the BureaucraticState, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1512 (1992) ("Over the past century, the powers
and responsibilities of administrative agencies have grown to an extent that calls into question
the constitutional legitimacy of the modern federal bureaucracy."); Sidney Shapiro et al., The

Enlightenment of Administrative Law: Looking Inside the Agency for Legitimacy, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 463, 463 (2012) ('The history of administrative law in the United States
constitutes a series of ongoing attempts to legitimize unelected public administration in a
constitutional liberal democracy."); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1676, 1679-81 (1975) (discussing techniques for
curtailing broad administrative discretion); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public
Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2035 (2005) ("Agencies are neither mentioned in the Constitution
nor directly responsive to the electorate, leaving their democratic legitimacy unclear.
Administrative law scholars have sought to ground the legitimacy of agency actions in a variety
of theories.").
5.
Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 2031.
See, e.g., KERWIN & FURLONG, supra note 3, at 114-17 (discussing the problems of
6.
participation and discretion in agency rulemaking).
7.
See infra Part II.A.
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federalism, this project pursues the converse inquiry: what might
states do for, or to, the longstanding legitimacy values that animate
administrative law?
Although the precise meaning of "legitimacy" is notoriously
elusive,8 it is most commonly associated with concerns regarding
agencies' unelected, constitutionally uncertain status. As an extension
of these concerns, commentators have long feared that agencies are
"particularly susceptible to the pressures imposed by powerful private
groups"9 and are thus prone to capture, faction, and deviation from
majority preferences. The decades-long effort to address these fears,
scholars agree, has yielded four main accounts, or "models," of
administrative legitimacy. The first and most dominant model
envisions agencies as instruments of presidential control. Under a
second, less dominant but still pervasive model, courts and
commentators cast agencies as experts engaged in apolitical problem
solving. The older, final two models of legitimacy portray agencies as
either mere "transmission belts" for congressional commands or
forums for bargaining among diverse interest groups.10 Without
attempting to resolve the longstanding debates among adherents to
these models, this Article explains that the privileged consultation
role for states envisioned by administrative federalism-and
increasingly playing out in practice-has important implications for
all four models.
The core insight is simple: a strong form of state consultation
threatens to undermine each model of legitimacy." With regard to
8.
See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 117, 123 (2006) (noting that "agency 'legitimacy' is a contested concept resting on other
contested concepts"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1787, 1790 (2005) ('Those who appeal to legitimacy frequently fail to explain what they mean or
the criteria that they employ."); Jody Freeman, The PrivateRole in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 543, 557 (2000) ("The concept of legitimacy has remained usefully vague in
administrative law theory, serving as a vessel into which scholars could pour their most pressing
concerns about administrative power.").
Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 VA.
9.
L. REV. 271, 291 (1986) [hereinafter Sunstein, Factions]; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Capture
Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1064-65 (1997) (describing
increased judicial efforts, fueled by concerns regarding agency capture, to control agency action);
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 66 (1985)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups] ("The constitutional status of administrative agencies has
been uncertain precisely because they evade the ordinary constitutional safeguards against
domination by powerful private groups.").
10. See infra Part III.
11. In undertaking the Article's analysis, I map legitimacy models onto a "strong" form of
state consultation in which states' privileged access yields some influence, such that consultation
is not merely a procedural formality. It is not necessary to the analysis to assume implausibly
that agencies always listen to states, or that they always do precisely what states ask; I assume
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presidential control, state consultation threatens to push federal
agencies away from the centralized, transparent control the model
prizes-a structure thought to make agencies responsive to national
preferences-and toward opaque decisionmaking and factional
interests. Regarding expertise, states will often push political agendas
that expertise-based legitimacy eschews. Probing the two earlier
legitimacy models exposes similar worries. States may happen to
enhance fidelity to Congress, but there is no logical reason that they
will do so; they are equally likely to pursue agendas at odds with
congressional commands. Finally, by giving voice to underrepresented
"public" interests, states could remedy what is often perceived as
skewed representation in agency rulemaking-yet they will often
exacerbate that skew by channeling powerful private influences from
their home state. Thus, what we find is that efforts to give states
special access to agency decisionmaking are in tension with the way
we legitimize bureaucracy.
None of this is to say that states participate in the regulatory
process with any ill intent, or that their contributions to agency
decisionmaking raise unique problems. Rather, this Article reflects
that states function much like other interest groups in the
administrative process 12 and shows that states thereby raise many of
the legitimacy concerns long associated with private influence over
agencies. From a legitimacy perspective, then, granting states
privileged, unrestricted access to agency decisionmaking and praising
the federalism benefits of state involvement without considering its
costs create incongruities requiring reflection.
Attending to the state role in federal regulation has significant
practical import. States currently act as consultants on regulatory
issues at the forefront of contemporary debates. In the healthcare
context, states have helped shape the content of regulations and

only that consultation has some substantive effect. In addition to being descriptively plausible,
see infra Part II.C, this assumption tracks the normative vision of administrative federalism: the
literature, legal instruments, and political proclamations that embrace a state role in
administrative decisionmaking seek some degree of state influence, not just access. Studying a
robust version of what administrative federalism seeks facilitates analytic clarity and helps
tease out the tensions with models of administrative legitimacy.
12. See Erin Ryan, NegotiatingFederalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1, 28-29 (2011) ("[Sltate agents
negotiate with federal policymakers just like any other lobby to protect their interests during
federal lawmaking. These negotiations reflect the normal workings of our interest group
representation model of governance, in which stakeholders leverage their representation to
accomplish their preferences during the legislative process."); see also ANNE MARIE CAMMISA,
GOVERNMENTS AS INTEREST GROUPS 21-34 (1995) (discussing the interest group activity of state
and local governments); DONALD H. HAIDER, WHEN GOVERNMENTS COME TO WASHINGTON 20-31,
46-113 (1974) (tracing the history and efficacy of states' federal lobbying efforts).
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guidance implementing the Affordable Care Act. 13 In the financial
context, states have participated in developing the hundreds of new
federal regulations required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act.' 4 And in environmental regulation-a
focus of this Article due to the extensive state-federal interaction it
entails' 5-states have played a consulting role in the development of
federal drinking water standards,16 air pollution standards,' 7 listings
under the Endangered Species Act,18 and waste regulation, 9 to name
just a few. It is time to consider how such state involvement squares
with the foundational concerns of administrative legitimacy.
The principal project of this Article is to reveal and explain the
tension between existing understandings of administrative legitimacy
and special state access to the federal regulatory process. Doing so
illuminates important areas for future work, and the Article sketches
two paths forward to alleviate the tension. First, the state role in the

13. See, e.g., Establishment of the Multi-State Plan Program for the Affordable Insurance
Exchanges, 77 Fed. Reg. 72,599 (proposed Dec. 5, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 800)
(describing state involvement in healthcare reform implementation); see also Gillian E. Metzger,
Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567, 578-79 (2011) (describing state
involvement in shaping Affordable Care Act regulations and implementation).
14. Dodd-Frank makes some state regulators nonvoting members of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council, 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(2) (2012), and requires the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau to institute a rulemaking when requested by a majority of states, id. § 5551.
See also Metzger, supra note 13, at 581-87 (describing state role in regulating and enforcing
issues addressed by Dodd-Frank).
15. Scholars routinely observe that environmental law provides a particularly rich resource
for observing state-federal interactions. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 12, at 9 (noting "in
environmental law,. . . jurisdictional overlap is particularly acute and ... the federalism
discourse is most driven to extremes"); Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110
MICH. L. REV. 521, 569 (2012) (describing the "uniqueness" of the EPA's relationship with states
and noting that the "EPA and the states have developed a collaborative relationship as
coregulators, particularly over the past twenty years"). Moreover, the EPA traditionally
promulgates among the highest number of rules of any federal agency, increasing the
opportunities for interaction and study. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS,
REVIEW COUNTS, www.reginfo.gov (last visited Dec.. 18, 2013).

16. See, e.g., William E. Cox, Evolution of the Safe Drinking Water Act: A Search for
Effective Quality Assurance Strategies and Workable Concepts of Federalism, 21 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 69, 90 (1997) (describing state involvement in development of the EPA's
groundwater rule); see also infra Part II.C.
17. See, e.g., Bill Becker & Amy Royden-Bloom, TOGAs: The Fabric of Our Democracy, 40
ENvTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,776, 10,777 (2010) (describing state persuasion of the EPA
to decrease the scope of the greenhouse gas permitting program); OFFICE OF POLICY, ECON., &
INNOVATION, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-231-F-06-004, SOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
THROUGH COLLABORATION (2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/nscep/index.html (discussing
EPA collaboration with states in developing the nonroad diesel rule).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 243-46 (describing the listing of the polar bear under
the Endangered Species Act).
19. See infra Part III.A.2 (describing proposals to regulate coal ash).
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administrative process could be reformed to better comport with
existing legitimacy models. This approach should be most attractive to
those who value the reigning legitimacy models; it would call for some
limits on state access to agency decisionmaking and greater
transparency regarding state involvement. Second, legitimacy models
could be updated to accommodate state involvement. A new model
might, for example, emphasize decentralized control and checks on
agency decisionmaking, to which states could contribute.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part II describes existing
state involvement in federal agency decisionmaking. Part II first
explains how federalism scholars and some judicial decisions have
advocated a special role for states in the administrative process in the
name of state autonomy. The Part then explains how that vision has
started to play out in practice, detailing who represents states in the
federal regulatory process, what interests they tend to pursue, and
through what channels they operate. This marks an independent
contribution to the administrative law literature, which has not yet
focused on the state role. Part II concludes by identifying reasons to
believe the view of some federalism scholars that states are influential
in the administrative process.
Part III explains the implications of a strong state-consultation
role for administrative legitimacy. It describes the prevailing
descriptive and normative accounts of administrative legitimacy and
explores the implications of state consultation for each, with emphasis
on the significant tensions that special state access creates. Part IV
sketches two possible paths forward, identifying potential reforms to
state involvement in agency decisionmaking and proposing new
directions for administrative legitimacy.
II. THE SPECIAL STATE ROLE IN FEDERAL AGENCY DECISIONMAKING

This Part explains the existing treatment of states in the
regulatory process. It turns first to the academy: Part II.A explains
how new scholarship on "administrative federalism" has praised a
state voice in the federal regulatory process. This new work generally
takes a sanguine view of state involvement in federal regulation and
seeks access for states that is not given to other interested parties.
According to this view, agencies should consult states early and often,
courts should tailor administrative deference to ensure that agencies
work with states, and states should be "partners" in the regulatory
process. Because these scholars have focused on the goal of advancing
federalism values, they have not had occasion to consider the costs
that a special state-consultation role may have for administrative
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legitimacy values. Part II.B explains who represents states and what
interests those actors tend to pursue. Part II.C then synthesizes
existing practice, focusing on channels of special state access to the
federal regulatory process that have not yet been considered as a
whole. Finally, Part II.D considers the plausible case that states have
some influence in the administrative process.
A. Administrative Federalism
"Administrative federalism" has captured significant attention
in recent years. 20 This emerging literature has arisen from twin
20. A brief etymology may be in order. "Administrative federalism" historically has been
used to describe the vertical structure of cooperative federalism. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,
The PoliticalEconomy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual
Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 942-43 & n.422 (1998) (using "administrative
federalism" to mean "a theory of nonfederal governments' entitlements that assumes that such
governments will administer federal law but then ensures that they will enjoy a certain
minimum of discretion in such implementation," such as existed in the Articles of
Confederation). Hills notes that the term derives from the German system, where it describes an
arrangement in which "the central government is forced to use the bureaucracy of the local
governments to implement national law." See id. at 923 n.422 (citing ARTHUR B. GUNLICKS,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE GERMAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 203 (1986)); see also Frank R. Strong, The
Future of Federalism in the United States, 22 TEX. L. REV. 255, 275 (1944) (associating
administrative federalism with "the passing down through administration of centrallydetermined policy").
A new era of administrative federalism has a more particular focus: to find ways within
the administrative process and administrative law doctrine to further values associated with
federalism and, in particular, the protection of state autonomy. See Stuart Minor Benjamin &
Ernest A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57
DUKE L.J. 2111, 2131-32 (2008) (describing the "surprising amount of interest" devoted to
administrative federalism); Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism:
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1939
(2008) (concluding that agencies "outperform" other branches in "allocating policymaking power"
between federal and state governments); Scott A. Keller, How Courts Can Protect State
Autonomy from Federal Administrative Encroachment, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 48 (2008) (opining
that "[i]t may be most important to protect federalism in the administrative law context" because
"federal administrative regulations" can "reduce state autonomy without Congress ever
addressing these federalism concerns"); Wayne A. Logan, The Adam Walsh Act and the Failed
Promise of Administrative Federalism, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 993, 1005, 1013 (2010) (canvassing
existing administrative federalism literature and offering a case study in which "the posited
federalism benefits of agency rulemaking did not come to fruition"); Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron
and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 741-42 (2004) (observing that although agencies
"generally have significant incentives to take state concerns seriously," they are inferior to the
other branches at valuing broader federalism values, such that courts should not grant Chevron
deference to agency preemption decisions); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New
Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2028 (2008) [hereinafter Metzger, New Federalism] (examining
the possibilities of judicial use of administrative law "as a vehicle for addressing federalism
concerns"); Metzger, supra note 13, at 570 (noting "the central importance of the administrative
sphere to modern-day federalism," because agencies, as opposed to Congress or the courts, will
make "[c]ritical decisions about the actual scope of state powers and autonomy"); Catherine M.
Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: "Agency-Forcing"Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2127-28
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perceptions: (1) that many federalism-affecting decisions are being
made by agencies, 21 and (2) that administrative law potentially
provides important tools for protecting federalism values. 22 The vigor
behind this effort flows from the view that existing constitutional
doctrines impose few limits on the scope of federal action. If the
Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment, for example, fail to restrict
meaningfully the scope of federal legislative authority, and the
toothless nondelegation doctrine does not prevent Congress from
giving agencies sweeping discretion, then administrative law becomes
an important backstop.
The goal of administrative federalism is to seize opportunities
in the administrative process and administrative law doctrine to
promote federalism values. There are many such values, of course;
administrative federalism scholarship generally refers to those of
protecting state power and of enhancing respect for state interests.
Gillian Metzger, for example, uses both "federalism" and "state
interests" to "refer primarily to protecting the ability of the states to
exercise meaningful regulatory power in their own right."2 3 Others
pursue similar goals. 24 Catherine Sharkey focuses on the related, more
(2009) (concluding that "federal agencies ... surprisingly emerge as the best possible protectors
of state regulatory interests" and that agencies should be "reform[ed] ... to ensure they can
become a rich forum for participation by state governmental entities"); Amy Widman, Advancing
Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law Through a Revitalization of State Enforcement
Powers: A Case Study of the Consumer Product Safety and Improvement Act of 2008, 29 YALE L.
& POL'Y REV. 165, 167-68 (2010) (exploring tools that promote state enforcement of federal
regulatory law as a means of "restoring the federalism balance"); Ernest A. Young, Executive
Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 869, 869 (2008) (noting that "[flederal administrative action is, in
important ways, considerably more threatening to state autonomy than legislation is" and
recommending ways to limit administrative preemption); cf Gillian E. Metzger, Federalismand
Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) [hereinafter Metzger, Federal Agency
Reform] (exploring the possibility that recent Supreme Court preemption decisions might "assign
the states a special role in policing and reforming federal administration"). By using the term
here, I refer to this more recent incarnation of administrative federalism.
21. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 20, at 45 ("[T]he hard questions about federalism now
appear in administrative law cases. Courts and commentators are becoming wary of the ability of
federal agencies to encroach on state autonomy, given the underenforced constitutional norms of
federalism and the nondelegation doctrine."); Metzger, supra note 13, at 610 (noting "the critical
importance of federal administrative agencies in determining the terms of state involvement and
extent of state authority").
22. See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 20, at 2109 ("[G]iven the breadth of
Congress's constitutional powers today, the future of federalism lies in integrating protections for
the states into agency deliberations and judicial review of agency action.").
23. See id. at 2109 n.4 (noting that other scholars "have similarly identified preserving state
regulatory autonomy as central to the project of federalism" (citing Ernest A. Young, The
Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms,83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13-15, 23-36 (2004))).
24. See Mendelson, supra note 20, at 741 (noting the article's assumption "that federalism
values, such as ensuring core state regulatory authority and autonomy, are important"); Young,
supra note 20, at 880-81 (proposing ways to use preemption doctrine to protect state autonomy).
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specific value of "giving heed to state regulatory interests and how
they interact with federal regulatory schemes." 25 She identifies a goal
of making agencies "accountable" to "state regulatory interests" and
proposes reforms to "transform the existing relationship between
states and federal agencies into a true partnership." 26
Although these scholars identify a variety of ways to
implement their goals, 27 they tend implicitly or explicitly to agree that
a greater state role in federal agency decisionmaking would advance
their project. 28 Sharkey has been perhaps the most emphatic on this
point. She views Executive Order 13,132,29 the Clinton-era order that
establishes executive branch policies regarding federalism ("the
Federalism Order"), as providing a critical "blueprint" for relations
between the states and federal agencies, and she praises its vision of
"a cooperative partnership between states and agencies in the
development of rules and regulations."3 0 She specifically seeks not
only compliance with the Order but also consultation on "a regular
basis, even when the agency thinks that there is no federalism
impact," and notice to states early in the rulemaking process so that
they can help shape the rule's substance. 31 Metzger is less pointed in
25. Sharkey, supranote 20, at 2147-48.
26. Id. at 2170, 2191-92. In a forthcoming work, I disaggregate the goals of administrative
federalism. See Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 99 VA. L.
REV. (forthcoming September 2014). For purposes of this Article, it suffices to describe the
objectives most commonly stated by leading scholars.
27. In particular, it is worth noting here that the procedural mechanisms I focus on in this
Article are not necessarily the prime focus of most administrative federalism scholars. Much
administrative federalism literature, for example, has focused on the level of deference (if any)
that agencies should receive when taking actions that would preempt state law. See generally
Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 695, 706
(2008); Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina A. Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of Federalism, in
PREEMPTION CHOICE 13, 26-27 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (noting concern that federal
agencies are "focused on federal needs and powers" and are consequentially "ill-suited to
weigh ... state and local interests in the course of accomplishing federal goals"); Young, supra
note 20, at 886 (arguing that courts should not defer to an agency's conclusions regarding a
statute's preemptive effect). That said, the preference for consultations between states and
federal agencies is a consistent thread in the literature.
28. While administrative federalism scholars have not considered the legitimacy of
agency-state consultation, they have considered "legitimacy" of another sort-the permissibility
of courts imposing heightened standards when agency decisions implicate federalism values.
Compare Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 20, at 2091-100 (arguing that courts can
legitimately use both ordinary and special administrative law doctrines to serve federalism
values), with Benjamin & Young, supra note 20, at 2136-40 (arguing that an approach to
administrative federalism focused on agencies rather than Congress is illegitimate).
29. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000). The Order requires agencies, inter alia, to
consult with states when developing regulations that would have implications for federalism. See
infra Part II.B.
30. Sharkey, supra note 20, at 2129-30.
31. Id. at 2170-71.

454

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:2:443

her prescriptions, but she too accepts that federal agencies'
consideration of state interests or concerns would be in line with
federalism goals-and that administrative law doctrines could be
modified to require agencies to undertake such consultations. 32 Others
writing in this area also embrace the import of state input,33 with
some suggesting that judicial deference might be conditioned on
agencies' engagement in meaningful consultations with states. 34
As Metzger has noted, some recent Supreme Court cases might
be understood as embracing administrative federalism values, in part
because the cases indicate concern when agencies shut states out of
the decisionmaking process. 35 First, such concern is evident in
Gonzalez v. Oregon,36 which held that the Controlled Substances Act
did not authorize an interpretive rule effectively proscribing Oregon's
dispensation of substances to assist suicide. 37 The Court noted, among
other problems, that the U.S. Attorney General had failed to consult
with Oregon's attorney general before issuing the rule, despite the
latter's request for a meeting. 38 Second, in Wyeth v. Levine, the Court
rejected the FDA's preemptive rule in part because of the agency's
blatant bait and switch in response to state inquiries regarding the
rule's effect. 39 Third, Massachusetts v. EPA, the 2007 climate change
32. Metzger, New Federalism,supra note 20, at 2086.
33. See Mendelson, supra note 20, at 777 (describing the potential for state participation in
agency decisionmaking to "increase the chances that an agency hears and takes seriously
arguments relating to federalism values and state interests").
34. See Young, supra note 20, at 891-92 (describing a potential preemption-specific version
of Skidmore deference). In a related vein, many scholars who oppose or wish to limit preemption
decisions by federal agencies do so in part because they believe agencies are not sufficiently
sensitive to state interests. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
315, 331 (2000) (discussing the idea that preemption decisions "must be made legislatively, not
bureaucratically" because of "the various safeguards against cavalier disregard of state interests
created by the system of state representation in Congress").
35. See Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 20, at 2031-39 (analyzing administrative
federalism principles in ADEC v. EPA, Gonzales v. Oregon, and Massachusetts v. EPA). Metzger
also describes other federalism-related concerns evident in Supreme Court decisions, including
concerns that decisions substantively intruded upon state interests. See id. at 2058-60.

36. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
37. Id. at 269-70.
38. Id. at 253-54, 270; see Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 20, at 2056 & n.123
("[L]ack of consultation is a theme the Oregon majority returned to frequently, noting in
particular that the attorney general [sic] failed to consult with Oregon notwithstanding Oregon's
express request . . . ."). The Court also stated that the interpretive rule intruded on the
traditionally "local concern" of health and safety regulation. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 271
(quoting Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985)).
39. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009) (deeming the FDA's "views on state
law .. . inherently suspect in light of [its] procedural failure" to "offer[] states or other interested
parties notice or opportunity for comment" on the rule's preemptive effect); see also Metzger,
FederalAgency Reform, supra note 20, at 17 (noting "the majority's criticism of the FDA's failure
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decision, 40 might be understood as suggesting that federal agencies
have not merely procedural obligations to hear state views but also
substantive obligations to heed them, at least where states face
collective action problems. These factors gave Massachusetts "special
solicitude" in the Court's standing analysis. 41 Four years later, in
American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, a case decided after
Metzger's study, the Court underscored the state-consultation role
when it described Massachusetts v. EPA, explaining that it is
"altogether fitting" that the EPA-and not the judiciary-is the
"primary regulator of greenhouse gas emissions" in part because the
EPA can consult with state regulators when reaching a decision. 42
These opinions do not, or perhaps do not yet, establish a doctrinal rule
grounded in administrative federalism. Still, they develop a theme
resonating with Justice Stevens's dissenting position in Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co.-that "dialogue" between states and
agencies through the notice-and-comment process is critical to
bridging agencies' "political accountability gap" and addressing
federalism concerns. 43
The next two Sections describe how some of the ideals of
administrative federalism have already gained traction in practice
through state access to the regulatory process. 44
B. States and Their Interests
Legal literature often elides the question of who represents
states in the federal regulatory process, treating "the states" as a
to provide states with notice and an opportunity to comment on its changed preemption views or
a detailed defense of that change").

40. 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007).
41. Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court makes heavy reference not only to
Massachusetts's "procedural right," but also to the EPA's duty and responsibility to "protect
Massachusetts" in light of the "sovereign prerogatives" that states gave up when they joined the
union. See id. at 519, 520, 527; see also Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 20, at 2057
(describing the role of administrative procedure in the Court's standing analysis).
42. See Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539-40 (2011) (noting
that the agency can "seek the counsel of regulators in the states where the defendants are
located").
43. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 908 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. Some administrative law scholars not writing about federalism issues have occasionally
mentioned the possibility of a state role in agency decisionmaking, but only in passing. See, e.g.,

Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portraitof the Modern
Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 911 n.72 (2008) ("Other agencies and states can also
pressure agencies."); Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of
EPA's Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 141 (2011) (noting that empirical
results indicate substantial state participation in rulemaking and stating that further study is
warranted "to better understand ... the role of the states").
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generic category, or as fifty monoliths. Yet in order to assess the effect
of state involvement on administrative legitimacy, one must have
some sense of who the relevant state actors are in the federal
regulatory process and what interests they tend to advocate. This
Section addresses those two questions.
1. Who Represents States in the Federal Regulatory Process?
Two players work most closely with federal agencies: state
administrators and state lobbying associations, which I call "state
interest groups." 4 5 Consider first state administrators. Due mainly to
the interdependent structure of federal programs, described in more
detail below, administrators-more so than elected officials-tend to
be knowledgeable about particular regulatory issues and immersed in
the details of the relevant programs. They often develop relationships
with their federal counterparts based on their common work and
shared professional experiences. To be sure, other state actors
sometimes interface with agencies; state legislators or governors
might comment on high-profile rulemakings, and the Federalism
Order calls for agencies to consult with elected state officials on
qualifying proposals. But as the guidance governing the Federalism
Order recognizes, interactions between federal and state
administrators are the norm. 46
When consulting with federal agencies, state administrators
often function through state interest groups. Although these groups
receive little attention, they play a central coordinating role in
45.

See, e.g., DANIEL ELAZAR, FEDERALISM 161-65 (2d ed. 1972) (describing relationships

that federal administrators have with state administrators and state interest groups).
Donald Haider's useful volume adopts the term "government interest groups," see
HAIDER, supra note 12, at 90; another group of authors has used the label "translocal
organizations of government actors" (TOGAs). See Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the
Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors
(TOGAs), 50 ARIz. L. REV. 709, 709-10 (2008). This Article focuses on the role of state officials
and their associations, saving for another day examination of associations of local officials, which
feature prominently in Haider and Resnik's studies.
46. The EPA's implementing guidance states that administrators should, "[o]f
course, . . . continue to work with your professional S/L government counterparts." ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, EPA's ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, GUIDANCE ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 13132, at 20
(2008), available at http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/111908rbl.pdf. Similarly, the OMB guidance

states, "We understand that many agencies consult routinely with their professional
counterparts in State and local governments (often civil servants, not elected officials)," and that
while agencies must include elected officials in the consultation process, they should also
"continue to work with their professional counterparts." OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, M-00-02, GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING E.O. 13132, at 4 (Oct. 28,

1999), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatory-matters
.pdf/m00-02.pdf.
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interactions between states and federal agencies, and their
involvement can affect consultations in meaningful ways. In a
separate work, I analyze state interest groups in detail.47 This Article
describes only briefly the groups' identities and procedural and
substantive roles.
State interest groups are an interesting breed, with qualities
both public and private-public because they exist to represent
members of state government, private because they are not part of
state government or accountable to a public constituency. 48 The oldest
and most well-known state interest groups represent generalist state
officials and are known as the "Big Seven."4 9 Many other groups
comprise specialized state administrators, and these interact even
more often with federal agencies. In the environmental context, the
key groups include the Environmental Council of the States, which
represents heads of state environmental protection agencies, as well
as dozens of subject-specific associations, like the National Association
of Clean Air Agencies and the Association of Safe Drinking Water
Administrators. State interest groups also exist in nearly every other
area of federal regulation. For example, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners and the National Association of Regulated
Utility Commissioners play prominent roles in the areas of insurance
and utility regulation, respectively.
Procedurally, state interest groups help direct state input into
each of the channels described below in Part II.C. The groups push
agencies to hold formal consultations pursuant to the Federalism
Order, and the groups' staff members usually participate in
consultations. They also coordinate and occupy informal channels,
conveying their members' views through calls and letters, organizing
and managing agency-state workgroups, and developing agendas and
resolutions that the groups' members wish to pursue with the agency.
Furthermore, state interest groups hold regular (usually biannual)
conferences that both state and federal administrators attend, further
facilitating ongoing dialogue.50
47. See Seifter, supranote 26.
48. See Resnik et al., supra note 45, at 729 ("As one scholar of municipal associations put it,
they are 'part interest groups, part associations, part institutions of government.'" (quoting

Bertram Johnson, Associated Municipalities: Collective Action and the Formation of the State
Leagues of Cities, 29 SOC. SCI. HIST. 549, 550 (2005))).
49. The "Big Seven" includes the National Governors Association, the National Conference
of State Legislatures, the National Association of Counties, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the
Council of State Governments, the National League of Cities, and the International City/County
Management Association. DAVID S. ARNOLD & JEREMY F. PLANT, PUBLIC OFFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS
AND STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 15 n.1 (1994).
50. See ELAZAR, supra note 45, at 164-65 (describing the groups' influence).
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Substantively, state interest groups share structural common
ground that shapes the content of their interactions with federal
agencies. Each group aims to represent a single state interest to
federal agencies on a given regulatory issue. Yet each group consists of
numerous, diverse state members, often with divergent views. As the
next Section explores further, the need to find common ground often
pushes the groups toward defenses of state fiscs and state autonomyand, in turn, frequently translates into resistance to federal regulatory
initiatives.
2. An Overview of State Interests
This Section sketches the interests these state actors tend to
pursue. Of course, there is no exclusive explanation of what motivates
states in the regulatory process. "[A] single-explanation theory of
regulatory politics," James Q. Wilson wrote, "is about as helpful as a
single explanation of politics generally, or of disease."5 1 But existing
literature on public administration and intergovernmental relations,
as well as existing state practices, do point to certain prevalent
interests of state administrators. Significantly for this Article's
analysis, the interests they pursue do not necessarily correspond to
the behaviors and values that legitimacy models have long directed
agencies to follow. Instead, the incentives and governance structures
that shape interactions between states and federal agencies suggest
that states frequently work at cross purposes with those values.
First, home-state politics constrain and motivate the policy
positions of individual state administrators; far from eschewing
politics or taking the pulse of a national majority, as dominant
administrative legitimacy theories contemplate, individual states'
input is heavily political. As scholarship on principal-agent dynamics
in administration explains, agencies, including state agencies, answer
to their elected political principals. 52 As a result, on issues important
51. JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 393 (1980); see also Jacob Gersen,
Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 333, 335
(Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell eds., 2010) (noting the "general consensus in the
literature that we simply do not know what the typical bureaucratic objective function looks
like").

52. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in ConstitutionalLaw, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 915, 934 (2005) (explaining that most recent models of bureaucratic behavior suggest
that bureaucrats are very responsive to politicians' preferences). The starting point for predicting
bureaucratic behavior was William Niskanen's model of budget maximization. See generally
WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, 36-42 (1971). In

years since, Niskanen's account has been critiqued and updated, with emphasis on principalagent accounts. See KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, ANALYZING POLITICS 407-41 (2d. ed. 2010) (collecting
sources).
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to state elected officials' platforms or to state constituencies, a state
agency's stance will be guided by its elected principals. Indeed, the
political scientist John Nugent has shown that state governors often
shape their agencies' positionS53 and sometimes actively vet or dictate
the positions state agencies take vis-A-vis the federal government. 54
Even absent such active controls, the positions of elected state
principals tend to confine their administrative agents. In states where
the governor or legislature does not acknowledge climate change,55 for
example, state environmental administrators are unlikely to advocate
greenhouse gas regulation to the EPA, regardless of what their
independent positions might be. Nor would state administrators in
pro-fracking states lobby the EPA to regulate the practice.56
Though home-state politics often guide state officials' advocacy,
state officials also have concerns for their regulatory autonomy and
fiscal stability. These concerns, which resonate with federalism goals,
can be understood as flowing from the need for what Wilson called
"organizational maintenance"-assuring "the necessary flow of
resources to the organization," including capital, labor, and political
support.5 7 State agencies need enough money to perform their duties
and enough breathing room to discharge those duties in an orderly
and sensible way. Studies reflect that states are frequently concerned
by "one-size-fits-all" federal programs58 that leave states with "limited
flexibility"5 9 as well as by federal regulation that imposes new costs

53.

See

JOHN D. NUGENT, SAFEGUARDING FEDERALISM 26-28 (2009) ("As heads of executive

branches, governors can more easily articulate and enforce fealty to their administration's
message.").
54. See id. at 26-27 (describing controls that governors exert over the positions of other
state officials).

55. See, e.g., Seth Cline, Global Warming Text Was Removed from Virginia Bill on Rising
Sea Levels, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORTS (June 13, 2012), http://www.usnews.cominews/
articles/2012/06/13/global-warming-text-was-removed-from-virginia-bill-on-rising-sea-levels
(describing recent legislative efforts in Virginia to remove climate change language from a
proposed bill).

56. See Ellen Burford, The Need for Federal Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing,44 URB.
LAW. 577, 583-85 (2012) (describing the incentives for states to loosely enforce their regulations
on fracking and the advantages of federal regulation).
57. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 181 (1991).
58. See NUGENT, supra note 53, at 45 (noting that state officials seeking flexibility
"complain about cookie-cutter and one-size-fits-all federal solutions to problems that manifest
themselves differently in different states").
59. See US Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-883, EPA-STATE ENFORCEMENT
PARTNERSHIP HAS IMPROVED, BUT EPA's OVERSIGHT NEEDS FURTHER ENHANCEMENT 10 (2007)
("Many state officials expressed concerns about having limited flexibility, too much EPA control,
and excessively detailed EPA oversight.").
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(like unfunded mandates).60
These institutional concerns frequently take a back seat to
politics when states interact individually with federal agencies, but
they are channeled forcefully by state interest groups, which must find
common ground among their diverse members and often must settle
for lowest common denominator positions.61 Because states can often
agree on preserving their existing authority, discretion, and funds,
and because states often perceive federal regulation as imposing
unwelcome burdens, state interest group resolutions often resist
federal regulatory initiatives. 62 State interest groups tend to either
oppose a regulation altogether63 or seek more lenient standards, 64
more time to comply,6 5 greater funding for federal programs that
involve states, 66 or greater flexibility.6 7

60. See NUGENT, supra note 53, at 40-44 (describing the concern state officials have for
their state's fiscal security).
61. See, e.g., HAIDER, supra note 12, at 214; Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political
Safeguardsof Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113,
1124 (noting that states often can only agree on vague policy statements).
62. To be sure, states do not perceive all federal regulations as entailing unwelcome
burdens, and even when they do, states may regard a particular federal regulation as providing a
net benefit (or a necessary evil) if it comes with funding. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 52, at 941
(stating federal spending is often desired by state officials). Still, it is not the norm for state
interest groups to advocate for new or more stringent federal regulation. In one instance where
such advocacy occurred, a contingent of the group's members ultimately revolted and started
their own alternative group. See Jeremy P. Jacobs, Officials From 17 States Launch Splinter
Group of Regulatory Agencies, GREENWIRE (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories/
1059975195 (describing rift within the National Association of Clean Air Agencies, which had
been urging the federal government to take action on greenhouse gas regulation and to protect
EPA's regulatory authority from proposed legislation that would have reduced it).
63. See, e.g., infra notes 204-12 and accompanying text (discussing state opposition to
regulation of coal ash).
64. See, e.g., infra note 149 and accompanying text (describing state lobbying of the EPA to
set more lenient thresholds for greenhouse gas permitting under federal "tailoring" rule).
65. See, e.g., Revision to Ambient Nitrogen Dioxide Monitoring Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg.
64,244, 64,244-49 (Oct. 19, 2012) (explaining that, based on state input, the EPA was proposing
to delay the deadlines for states to establish monitors for near-road nitrogen dioxide emissions).
66. See id. (explaining state complaints of insufficient funding to implement EPA rule); see
also ENvTL. COUNCIL OF THE STATES, RES. 09-5, FUNDING FOR CLEAN AIR ACT PROGRAMS UNDER
SECTIONS 103 AND 105 (2012) (recommending $301 billion to be made available to states through
grants); ENvTL. COUNCIL OF THE STATES, RES. 06-9, NATIONAL TRAINING STRATEGY
IMPLEMENTATION AND FUNDING (Aug. 28, 2012) (requesting the EPA use any available funds to

provide training for state air officials).
67. See NUGENT, supra note 53, at 46-50 (describing survey concluding that National
Governors Association and National Association of State Legislatures most commonly took
positions seeking to protect their administrative interests in flexibility); see also, e.g., ENVTL.
COUNCIL OF THE STATES, RES. 00-1, ON ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM (Mar. 20, 2012) (expressing

the organization's "support for the concept of flexibility" and urging that, "to the maximum
extent possible, the means of achieving [federal] goals should be left primarily to the states").
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These interests in home-state politics and state regulatory
authority bear no necessary connection to the duties with which
Congress charges federal agencies. Moreover, as elaborated in Part
III, asking agencies to honor state interests often operates in tension
with the values thought to legitimate federal agency action. Giving
states special access to the administrative process, then, sets a
collision course with administrative legitimacy.
C. States' PrivilegedAccess to the FederalRegulatory Process
States have come to hold privileged yet oft-overlooked access to
the federal regulatory process. States may engage in formal
consultations pursuant to transsubstantive legal instruments that
require agencies to consider state views, like the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 and the Federalism Order, or pursuant to subjectspecific statutes and agreements that give states a consultation role.
Even more of the action appears to come through states' informal and
largely subterranean consultations with agencies-through agencystate "workgroups," meetings, and regular conference calls arising
from states' status as "co-regulators" in federal programs.
In describing the mechanisms of consultation between states
and federal agencies, this Section focuses primarily on one agency, the
EPA. Like environmental law more generally, the EPA provides a
particularly rich context for studying state-federal interactions.68 The
EPA consistently generates among the most major rules of any federal
agency, and it administers "cooperative" statutory programs that
require sustained interaction with states. 69 The channels of agencystate consultation are thus particularly visible at the EPA. 70 For

Scholars of intergovernmental relations have offered similar accounts of the interests
states pursue vis-A-vis the federal government. In a 1972 article, the political scientist Richard
Lehne identified three categories of these interests: (1) obtaining money to benefit their state; (2)
advocating national policies that will be popular in their home state; and (3) autonomy--the
ability to determine how policies will be implemented. See Richard Lehne, Benefits in StateNational Relations, 2 PUBLIUS 75, 80-81 (1972) (citing SUZANNE FARKAS, URBAN LOBBYING
(1970) (explaining the three objectives of state officials in defining their relationship with the
federal government)).
68. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (describing the value of using the EPA as an
example of broader interactions between state and federal government officials).
69. See id.; see also infra notes 103-13 (discussing examples of "cooperative" statutory
programs and the EPA's participation in such programs).
70. This Article's focus on the EPA is consistent with the approach of generating insights by
focusing study on a specific institution. See Edward L. Rubin, Commentary, The New Legal

Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARv. L. REV.
1393, 1425-30 (1996) (discussing the concept of microanalysis as a way to study how specific
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reasons explained below, there is also cause to suppose that other
agencies, particularly those that likewise administer cooperative
statutes, follow similar consultation practices.
Why have the seminal accounts of the administrative process
not zeroed in on the relationship between states and agencies before?
One reason may be historical. Although agency-state relations are not
new, their rise has been facilitated by executive and legislative
developments that postdate most classic accounts of the
administrative process. Moreover, while the statutes that created
federal-state cooperative governance have been on the books for
decades, they have now "grayed with middle age,"7 1 and time has
hardwired working relationships that took some time to get off the
ground.
Second, most of the important exchanges between states and
federal agencies occur prior to the proposal of a rule, making the
relationship difficult to study. Indeed, notwithstanding judicial
characterizations of the notice-and-comment process as the means
through which states can share views with federal agencies, 72 states
seldom rely on the official comment process as a way to make
themselves heard (though submitting comments provides both a
second bite at the apple and a way to create a record for posterity and
subsequent litigation). 73 Because the interactions that precede a notice
of proposed rulemaking seldom appear in the Federal Register, 74 it is
often difficult to detect the state role. 75

institutions create and apply law); see also Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 2034 & n.15 (citing
Rubin in explaining the article's focus on environmental law).
71. RICHARD LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 254 (2004).
72. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 909-10 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(mentioning that states are assured a "dialog" with agencies before regulations are passed
through the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures).
73. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492-93
(1992) (famously comparing notice-and-comment rulemaking to Japanese Kabuki Theater and
stating that "[n]o administrator in Washington turns to full-scale notice-and-comment
rulemaking when she is genuinely interested in obtaining input from interest parties").
74. Many sources note that the same is true of presidential influence on agency decisions.
See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 3, at 2283 (noting that "rules, as a historic matter, very rarely have"
mentioned the President's role); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing A Place for Politics in Arbitrary
and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 23 (2009) (noting that "agencies ... either fai[l] to
disclose or affirmatively hid[e] political influences").
75. One important exception comes from a recent study. See Wagner et al., supra note 44, at
139-42. The authors tracked pre-Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM") consultations on
ninety rulemakings on hazardous air pollution by examining the EPA's docket index. Although
the EPA is not required to document pre-NPRM consultations, it "recorded extensive
communications" in the rulemakings at issue. The study found that states had fewer pre-NPRM
communications with the EPA than industry, but twice as many as citizen groups. The authors
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The absence of an administrative-process account of relations
between
states and agencies
may also flow,
perhaps
counterintuitively, from the dominance of federalism discourse.
Virtually any mention of state-federal relations tends to be cast in a
federalism frame. 76 This focus may crowd out attention to other
dimensions of those relations, including their implications for
administrative legitimacy.
The following description of state access foreshadows the
insight explored in the rest of the Article: the state-consultation role
implicates the legitimacy of administrative decisionmaking, not just
state autonomy. State consultations affect the substantive input that
federal agencies receive, the transparency with which that input
occurs, and the pressure agencies feel to accommodate various
demands. State consultations also affect agencies' accountability:
states might provide an additional checking function against broad
federal agency power, but in doing so, they may blur lines of
responsibility and reduce agencies' responsiveness to national
preferences.
1. "Formal" Consultations
First, agencies may consult with states under the auspices of
formal legal instruments: the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
("UMRA"),77 the Federalism Order, and subject-specific statutes and
agreements.
The UMRA, enacted at a time when opposition to alleged
federal overreaching ran so high that state and local officials staged a
"National Unfunded Mandates Day" in Washington, was intended to
limit federal impositions on state budgets.78 The Act requires federal
agencies, inter alia, to consult with state and local officials on
regulations that would impose intergovernmental mandates79 and to
concluded that "[g]iven their relatively high level of engagement throughout the process," further
study is warranted to better understand the role that states play. See id. at 141.
76. Cf. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on A National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 906 (1994) ("We Americans love federalism .... It conjures up
images of Fourth of July parades down Main Street, drugstore soda fountains, and family farms
with tire swings in the front yard.").
77. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109
Stat.) 48, (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501 et seq. (2012)).
78. See S. REP. 104-1, at 2 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 5 (discussing the
concern among state and local officials over unfunded mandates).
79. 2 U.S.C. § 1534(a). Federal intergovernmental mandates are defined to include federal
statutes or regulations that "impose an enforceable duty" on state or local governments, except
certain conditions of federal funding, as well as federal statutes or regulations that decrease
funding or strengthen conditions in certain existing federal programs. Id. § 658(5).
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conduct a detailed analysis for any rules that may result in state or
local burdens over $100 million.80 Because the definition of
intergovernmental mandates is complex and manipulable, relatively
few rules have triggered the Act's formal requirements.81 Still, some
rules have done so, 82 and familiarity with the Act's requirements may
well facilitate less formal communications with states.
The Federalism Order-itself issued only after "extensive
consultations" with state and local representatives" 83-requires
agencies to, inter alia, "consult[ ] with State and local officials early in
the process of developing" any proposed regulation with "federalism
implications." The Order defines federalism implications as those with
"substantial direct effects on the states, on the relationship between
the national government and the states, or on the distribution of
power and responsibilities among the various levels of government."84
The consultation is supposed to occur before a rule is proposed 85before other parties have an opportunity to comment-and should
involve "elected officials of State and local governments or their
representative national organizations," which the Office of
80. For such rules, the agency must prepare a written statement-before a notice of
proposed rulemaking and before promulgating a final rule-that analyzes the rule's "qualitative
and quantitative costs," effects on states and the national economy, and opinions expressed by
states. Id. § 1532(a).

81. See Few Rules Trigger Unfunded Mandates Reform Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Tech., Info. Policy, Intergovernmental Relations & ProcurementReform, Comm. on Oversight
& Gov't Reform, 111th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of Denise M. Fantone, Dir. Strategic Issues),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/125488.pdf.
82. See, e.g., Utility MACT for Coal and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304,
9438-39 (Feb. 16, 2012) (stating that the rule "may result in expenditures of $100 million or
more for state, local, and tribal governments" and thus triggered the UMRA's requirements).
83. NUGENT, supra note 53, at 65. The Federalism Order's back story reveals state
influence. Revoking the previous Reagan order on federalism, President Clinton issued a much
less state-oriented Executive Order 13,083. See Exec. Order No. 13,083, Federalism, 3 C.F.R.
146, 148 (1999) (revoking Executive Orders 12,612 and 12,875). States were outraged; the order
was perceived as a step backward for state sovereignty, and the administration had failed to
consult the states in developing it. See David S. Broder, Executive Order Urged Consulting, but
Didn't; State, Local Officials Want Federalism Say, WASH. POST, July 16, 1998, at A15 (stating
representatives of state and local governments wrote a letter to President Clinton demanding the
Order be withdrawn); see also NUGENT, supra note 53, at 65 (describing the concerns leading to
Executive Order 13,132). Three months later, President Clinton suspended Executive Order
13,083 and called for "full and adequate consultation" with states and other interested parties.
See Exec. Order No. 13,095, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1999) (suspending Executive Order 13,083). Executive
Order 13,132 followed. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000); see David S. Broder,

Federalism's New Framework; Revised Order Satisfies State and Local Officials, WASH. POST,
Aug. 5, 1999, at A21.
84. See Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, at 43,257-58 (outlining the
consultation process); id. at 43,255 (defining "[p]olicies that have federalism implications").
85. See id. at 43,258 (requiring a consultation with state or local officials before official
promulgation of the rule if practicable).
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Management and Budget ("OMB") has construed to mean the core
"Big Seven" state interest groups described above in Part II.B. 86 The
consultation is meant to obtain state input not only on potential
alternatives to national standards but also on the content of standards
that are set.87 Before promulgating any regulation with federalism
implications, a federal agency must prepare a "federalism summary
impact statement" describing the consultation process, state concerns,
and the extent to which the concerns have been addressed.88 Although
early studies indicated that the Federalism Order was largely
ignored,89 more recent developments suggest that the Order matters.
First, in 2008, the EPA promulgated its own guidance for
implementing the Order. 90 Developed in consultation with state
officials, the EPA guidance goes further than the Order or other
federal law requires. Whereas the UMRA sets the consultation
threshold at $100 million in costs to state or local governments, the
EPA guidance calls for consultation where costs may reach just
$25 million. 91 Moreover, the guidance directs agency officials to take
seriously the consultation process and prescribes detailed steps and
flow charts for compliance. In the years since the guidance was issued,
the EPA has conducted twelve formal consultations, dwarfing the
previous consultation rate.92 And in 2013, the EPA conducted its first
86. See White House Letter on Consultation and List of 'Representative National
Organizations' Contacts to Donald J. Borut, Executive Director of the National League of Cities
(Mar. 9, 2000), reprinted in ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 46 (Attachment C), available at
http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/111908rbl.pdf.
87. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 43,256 (requiring agencies to consult with state and local officials
when considering the development of and alternatives to national standards).
88. Id. at 43,258. The agency must also supply the OMB with written communications that
state officials submitted to the agency. Id.
89. See Mendelson, supra note 20, at 784 (finding that federalism impact analyses pursuant
to the Order were completed at a rate of "one in a hundred or less"). While noting that
bottom-line conclusions are difficult without knowing whether other rules in fact had federalism
implications, Mendelson also observes that "the data raise a concern that agencies may not
consider federalism impacts in every appropriate case." Id. A 1999 GAO Report reached similar
findings, reporting that only five federalism impact analyses had been done for the over 11,000
rules issued between 1996 and 1998. See Federalism:Implementation of Executive Order 12612
in the Rulemaking Process: Testimony Before the S. Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 106th Cong.
1 (1999) (statement of L. Nye Stevens, Director, Federal Management and Workforce Issues)
(stating that federalism assessments were rarely conducted).
90. See ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 46, at 21 (discussing the EPA's consultation
policy). Sharkey has observed that the EPA "stands apart" from other agencies in its track record
on agency-state relations. Sharkey, supranote 15, at 532.
91. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 46, at 6 (defining what the EPA considers to be
"substantial compliance costs").
92. The contemplated (preproposal) rules at issue and dates of consultation included
proposals regarding Coal Combustion Residuals (October 2009); the Boiler Area Source Rule
(March 2010); NSPS Sewage Sludge Incinerators (May 2010); Water Quality Standards Rule
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state consultation based solely on a rule's likelihood of preempting
state law-a long-ignored criterion for consultation under the Order. 93
In addition, the Obama administration has expressed support
for the Federalism Order's requirements, a development which may
increase other federal agencies' commitment to state consultations. An
empirical study conducted by Catherine Sharkey concluded that an
Obama administration memorandum on preemption issued in 2009,94
which, inter alia, reaffirmed the Order's requirements, has caused a
"policy shift" within agencies. 95 Furthermore, nearly all of the recent
rulemakings under the Affordable Care Act have involved
consultations with states.96
In addition to the transsubstantive consultation requirements
imposed by the UMRA and the Federalism Order, subject-specific
statutes and agreements require agencies to consult with states. The
Endangered Species Act, for example, requires the Fish and Wildlife
Service ("FWS") to invite and consider state comments on proposed
decisions to list species as threatened or endangered. It additionally
requires the FWS to provide a written justification for failing to heed
the state comments.97 The Affordable Care Act requires the relevant

(September 2010); NPDES Electronic Reporting Rule (September 2010); Utility MACT, coal and
oil-fired (September 2010); Storm Water Discharges from Developed Sites (December 2010);
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, (April 2011) Steam
Electric Utility Effluent Limitations Guidelines (October 2011); Waters of the U.S. Rule.
(October - December 2011); Lead and Copper in Drinking Water (November 2011); Uniform
National Discharge Standards for Military Vessels (April 2013).
93. See Letter from EPA to Intergovernmental Associations (Mar. 1, 2013) (on file with
author); see also Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,258 (requiring agencies to
consult with state or local officials prior to promulgating a rule that preempts state or local
laws).
94. See Preemption: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
74 Fed. Reg. 24,693, 24,693-94 (May 20, 2009) (directing agencies to limit their preemption
attempts and to conduct a ten-year retrospective review of preemptive provisions to determine
their compliance with federalism principles).
95. See Sharkey, supranote 15, at 531-32 (describing the change in agency policy caused by
the preemption memorandum); see also Metzger, supra note 13, at 594-95 (mentioning agencies
that "adopted notably more cautious positions on preemption").
96. Examples of Affordable Care Act rulemakings that involved consultations with states
include: Health Insurance Market Rules, Rate Review, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,584, 70,610 (Nov. 26,
2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 144, 147, 150, 154 & 156); Establishment of Exchanges and
Qualified Health Plans, Exchange Standards for Employers, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,310, 18,443 (Mar.
27, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 155-57); Establishment of the Multi-State Plan
Program for the Affordable Insurance Exchanges, 77 Fed. Reg. 72,582, 72,599-600 (Dec. 5, 2012)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 800).
97. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(i) (2012); see also In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing &
Section 4(d) Rule Litig.-MDL No. 1993, 709 F.3d 1, 17-18 (D.C. Cir.) (describing an agency's
obligation under the Act to respond to a state's comments), cert. denied sub nom., Safari Club
Int'l v. Jewell, 2013 WL 3948014 (U.S. 2013).
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federal agencies to consult with a state interest group in the
development of several regulations, and it instructs the group to
establish certain substantive standards under the Act, subject to
agency approval.9 8 And where statutes do not impose consultation
requirements, agencies have sometimes conducted them voluntarily,
entering into formal agreements with state officials or state interest
groups to collaborate on various federal regulatory programs.99
To varying degrees, all of these legal instruments require the
expenditure of resources and adherence to formal rules to satisfy
consultation requirements.1 0 0 By contrast, various channels of
informal consultation allow agencies to hear state views in contexts
that are less visible, less expensive, and less restricted. As the next
Section describes, states and agencies commonly use these informal
channels.
2. Informal Consultations
Much of the interaction between states and federal agencies
occurs through informal consultations. This Section begins by
describing two reasons that states succeed at obtaining an agency
audience: First, the responsibilities of state and federal administrators
intertwine under many federal programs. Second, because state
consultation is legally required, and states are not regarded with the
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 18053 (creating interstate "health care choice compacts"); id. § 300gg
(defining the "permissible age bands" for rate-setting purposes); id. § 300gg-15(a) (setting
standards for explanation of benefits and coverage); id. § 18061(b) (requiring the Secretary to
consult the NAIC while creating the "transitional reinsurance" program; id. § 18041(a)
(describing the process for establishment and operation of health insurance exchanges). These
requirements are described in Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Reflections on the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners and the Implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2045 (2011) (describing the NAIC's role in implementing the
Affordable Care Act).
99. See, e.g., Agreement between CFPB and CSBS, CFPB-State Supervisory Coordination
Framework
(May 7, 2013),
available at http://www.csbs.org/regulatory/CooperativeAgreements/Documents/2013-CFPB.pdf (outlining a supervisory agreement between the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Conference of State Bank Supervisors); cf.
Mendelson, supra note 20, at 774 (noting "countless examples" of MOUs that "may delegate
federal implementation responsibility to states, result in cooperative enforcement efforts, or
devise cooperative procedures for resolving issues").
100. At the EPA, agency staff must report to the EPA's Office of General Counsel before
undertaking a consultation pursuant to Executive Order 13,132 and must ultimately report to
the OMB on correspondence related to rules with federalism implications. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
supra note 46, at 9, 22. Before commencing the official consultation, administrators are
instructed to work preliminarily with state officials to establish a consultation plan. Id. at 22-24
(stating that EPA administrators are "strongly encouraged to consult with potentially affected
S[L leaders or their national organizations before deciding how much consultation would be
appropriate and before preparing a final consultation plan").
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same suspicion as are private parties, state consultation possesses an
aura of validity that does not attach to federal agency consultations
with other interested groups. This Section then describes the channels
and mechanisms of informal consultation.
a. Informal Consultationsas Facilitatedby Intertwined
Regulatory Roles
As literature on cooperative federalism illuminates, the
intertwined, "marble cake" responsibilities of state and federal
regulators within many federal programs contribute to states'
prominent voice in federal agency decisionmaking. 01 The overlapping
structure of regulatory programs creates a co-regulator relationship
between state and federal administrators and thereby affords states
special access to the federal regulatory process.1 02
This state-federal interdependence is most salient under classic
cooperative federalism statutes such as the Clean Air Act 103 and
Medicaid,104 which delegate the implementation of federal programs to
states.10 But state-federal interdependence also occurs in
nondelegated federal programs, for states often still play critical roles
in monitoring, 06 enforcement,107 or other program support. Under the

101. See

Morton

Grodzins,

The

Federal System

(1960),

reprinted in AMERICAN

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 54 (Laurence O'Toole ed., 4th ed. 2007); see also ELAZAR, supra

note 45, at 50-53. By invoking marble cake rather than layer cake, Grodzins's classic account
conveyed that there are no strictly state or federal policy areas in modern government. Instead,
all important functions involve federal, state, and local governments. Even the "most local of
local functions" like law enforcement, or the "purest central government activities" like foreign
affairs, involve important roles for both the federal and state governments. Grodzins, supra, at
54-55.
102. CAMMISA, supra note 12, at 22-23; see also HAIDER, supra note 12 at 228-33.
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-642.
104. Id. §§ 1396-1396v.
105. Another example is the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which allows states to oversee
implementation agreements between telecommunications carriers. See Philip J. Weiser,
Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 19
(1999). An extensive legal literature documents the dynamics and implications of cooperative
federalism regimes. See, e.g., id.; Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative
Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009) (describing phenomenon of states challenging federal
authority when implementing statutes); Abbe R. Gluck, IntrastatutoryFederalismand Statutory
Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE
L.J. 534 (2011) (addressing statutory interpretation questions raised by statutes that designate
states as implementers).
106. See EPA & ECOS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTANT REPORTING DATA IN EPA's NATIONAL

SYSTEMS: DATA COLLECTION BY STATE AGENCIES 1 (Sept. 30, 1999) (study finding that "states are
responsible for 83 to 99 percent of the environmental pollutant data contained in six key EPA
data systems").
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few federal environmental statutes in which states do not have
"primacy" in running the regulatory program, for example, states are
first-line enforcers, recipients of infrastructure grants, and collectors
of a tremendous portion of the data upon upon which federal
decisionmakers rely.108 Similar stories play out in many other
substantive areas, including criminal law,109 immigration,110 and
financial regulation.11 ' In all of these contexts, the federal government
depends on states for the programs' success, and that interdependence
impels agencies to consult with states before setting federal
regulations in the first instance. 112 EPA officials have explicitly stated
that the Agency is "very respectful" of states' implementation role in
cooperative federalism schemes and recognizes the "need to coordinate
with the states," to "talk to them very thoroughly" before rules are
proposed, and to act "in a collaborative way" with states. 113
Furthermore, the shared nature of regulatory programs also
leads federal and state regulators to develop close bonds and
loyalty.11 4 State and federal regulators work together often, and over
time their working relationships become hardwired. They also grow to
share a sense of a common ground and mission."6 Unlike other
entities with whom federal agencies deal, state administrators are
regulators too, with the expertise, stature, and common
understanding that their positions bring. Consulting with state
counterparts may therefore be a matter of respect and camaraderie as
well as necessity.
107. See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 737
(2011) (arguing that state enforcement of federal law allows states to shape policy).
108. See EPA & ECOS, supra note 106, at 1 ("states have the primary responsibility for the
collection of environmental pollutant data"); Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the
Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 454 (2005) ("[Mlost
environmental monitoring and enforcement occur at the state and local level.").
109. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 12, at 31 (describing collaborative strike force agreements
and other interjurisdictional partnerships in the criminal context).
110. See id. at 34-35 (describing Immigration and Nationality Act ACCESS Program, which
delegates to state and local officers enforcement of certain immigration matters).
111. See, e.g., Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys General
After Dodd-Frank, IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2207726
(discussing the role of state attorneys general under the Dodd-Frank Act).
112. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 278 (2000) [hereinafter Kramer, Political Safeguards]; Larry D.
Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1493 (1994) [hereinafter Kramer,
UnderstandingFederalism].
113. Inside EPA, Interview with EPA Air & Radiation Office Chief Gina McCarthy (Jan. 24,
2013).
114. See Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 112, at 1554 (discussing how
alliances form between federal and state officials).
115. ELAZAR, supranote 45, at 162-63.
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b. Informal Consultations as Facilitatedby the Limited Restrictions on
State Involvement
States' privileged access to federal agency decisionmaking also
flows from the absence of opposition to or limitations on state
consultations. The legal instruments described in Part II.C.1 do not
just permit agencies to consult with states but affirmatively require
such consultations early in the regulatory process. Moreover, whereas
agencies often receive criticism for working too closely with private
entities, state consultations seldom arouse the public's suspicion or
disapproval. Indeed, while a deep literature documents the perils of
agency capture by private entities, neither courts nor commentators
use the language of capture to describe state influence on agencies.
Furthermore, another feature of the earlier-discussed
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act facilitates informal state
consultations. The Act exempts all consultations between states and
federal agencies, whether required or not, from the requirements of
the Federal Advisory Committee Act ("FACA").116 To appreciate the
import of this exemption, it is worth pausing to note the tremendous
burden that FACA, despite receiving little scholarly attention,
ordinarily imposes on agency communications. FACA's definition of an
advisory committee is "sweeping,"" 7 and the involvement of even one
nonfederal advisor can bring a consultation within the statute's
reach."s When FACA is triggered, the agency must ensure that any
advisory committee represents a balance of viewpoints, 119 file a
detailed charter,120 publicize meetings in advance and allow public
attendance,121 disclose meeting minutes and any materials the
committee relies upon,122 and ensure the committee exercises
independent judgment.123 In fiscal year 2010, the estimated total cost
to operate existing advisory committees-nearly 1,000 committees
with roughly 80,000 members-was nearly $400 million, including
approximately $180 million in federal salaries and expenses needed to

116. 2 U.S.C.

§ 1534(b) (2012).

117. Ass'n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
118. See 5 U.S.C. § 1.

119. Id. §5(b)(2).
120. Id. §9(c).
121. Id. § 10(a).
122. Id.

§ 10(b),

(c).

123. Id. § 5(b)(3).
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support committee operations. 124 Agencies and presidents alike dread
these expenses. 125
The FACA exemption for federal-state meetings, then, is a boon
for states. This is all the more so because both the OMB's
implementing guidelines and the courts have interpreted it broadly.
The OMB's guidelines emphasize that the FACA exemption must be
"construed broadly" and must "not ... act as a hindrance to full and
effective intergovernmental consultation." They provide that the
exemption applies "to the entire range of intergovernmental
responsibilities or administration," 12 6 including meetings called for
"any purpose relating to intergovernmental responsibilities or
administration." 127 Exempt consultations need not occur with state
elected officers but may instead involve state "officials, employees,"
and state interest groups. 128 The courts have embraced this expansive
construction. 129
c. Avenues of Informal Consultation
Shaped by deeply intertwined state-federal regulator
relationships and liberated by the lack of legal limitations or public
opposition, the EPA's informal consultations with states proceed
through several mechanisms.
First, there are numerous state-EPA "workgroups" that
collaborate on specific rules and policy issues. 130 Current practice
under the Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") provides one example.
Pursuant to a written set of "guiding principles" for state-federal
interactions in rulemaking (which was itself developed by a state-EPA
124. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE FOR H.R. 3124, FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ACT AMENDMENTS OF 2011, at 2 (2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/hr3l24.pdf.
125. President Clinton ordered agencies to terminate at least one-third of FACA-covered
advisory committees and to strictly limit the formation of any new committees. See Exec. Order
No. 12,838, 58 Fed. Reg. 8207 (Feb. 10, 1993).
126. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, M-95-20,
GUIDELINES AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING SECTION 204 (Sept. 21, 1995), available at
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/101011.
127. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 46. Similarly, state-federal consultations
pursuant to Executive Order 13,132 are not subject to FACA. See id.
128. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 126. I discuss state interest groups in Part
II.B.
129. Thus, consultations under a historic preservation plan among a group that included
federal officials as well as state, local, and tribal officials were not subject to FACA. See Wyo.
Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1304-05 (D. Wyo. 2001), aff'd, 383 F.3d
1241 (10th Cir. 2004).
130. See generally EPA-STATE/ECOS JOINT ACTIVITIES, CALENDAR YEAR 2013 (on file with
author) (listing active workgroups).
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workgroup), the EPA is to identify state experts to sit on rule-specific
workgroups; the state experts can then participate in a rule's
development until the EPA formally closes the group and commences
final agency review.18 1 State-EPA workgroups must stay in regular
contact during the development of potential proposed rules. Similar
processes play out under other statutes that the EPA administers.
Under the Clean Water Act, for example, states recently took part in
"extensive EPA-state discussions" and participated in a months-long
"EPA-state workgroup process" that "informed the development of
draft guidelines" for the EPA's nonpoint source program.132
State-EPA workgroups address a range of topics, from
relatively technical issues to the major terms of important
rulemakings. The EPA does not catalog these workgroups, so
determining their quantity and scope is difficult. However, the record
of recent rulemaking efforts suggests that agencies convene
workgroups frequently, providing states a significant opportunity to
have a voice in developing rules that concern them. 133 On the technical
side, for example, a state-EPA workgroup collaborated for
approximately two years to develop guidance allowing the Consumer
Confidence Reports required under the SDWA-once identified by
former EPA Administrator Carol Browner as the "single most effective
action we can take to protect the environment"134-to be distributed by
e-mail rather than post.13 5 State-EPA workgroups have also worked to

131. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR RULE DEVELOPMENT (May 31,
2002) (on file with author). The stated purpose of the principles is "to guide the State/EPA coregulator partnership in the development of better, more common sense drinking water
regulations." Id.
132. Comment Letter from Steven Gunderson, ACWA, to Denise Keeher, USEPA (Dec. 14,
2012), availableat http://www.acwa-us.org/#!_1etters.
133. See, e.g., ENVTL. COUNCIL OF THE STATES, ECOS ANNUAL REPORT (2012), available at
http://www.ecos.org/files/4866_file_2012_AnnualReport.pdf;
Ass'n of Clean Water Admins.,
Weekly Wrap, Nov. 12-16 (2012) (on file with author); State/EPA Workgroup on Work
Prioritization (2011), available at http://www.westar.org/Docs/Business%20Meetings[Fallll/
06.3%2OTop%2010%200pportunities%20for%20Greater%2Efficiency%20or%2OReduced%2OBur
den%20Without%20Compromising%2OPublic%2OHealth.pdf.

134. Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "New (New) Federalism'"
Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 216 (1996).
135. See EPA Interpretive Memorandum, Consumer Confidence Report Rule Delivery
Options (Jan. 3, 2013) (allowing electronic delivery), available at http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/
rulesregs/sdwa/ccr/upload/ccrelectronicdeliveryppt.pdf;
see also ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
CONSIDERATION OF REGULATORY REVISIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE SECOND Six-YEAR REVIEW OF
THE NATIONAL PRIMARY DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS, at B-7 to B-8 (2009), available at
http://water.epa.govllawsregs/rulesregs/regulatingcontaminants/sixyearreview/second-review/upl
oad/Consideration-of-Other-Regulatory-Revisions-in-Support-of-the-Second-Six-Year-Review.pdf
(describing "joint EPA/State workgroup").
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develop proposed rules in the context of air pollution,8 6 water
pollution, 37 and waste. 38
Beyond the workgroups, there are many other ongoing
communications between state and federal administratorssometimes organized, sometimes ad hoc. State interest groups, which
Part II.B described, channel many of these communications. Federal
environmental administrators often attend the annual or biannual
meetings of these groups, including the Environmental Council of the
States ("ECOS"), the national group of state environmental
commissioners, as well as specific groups devoted to air, water, and
waste.139 In addition, each of these interest groups holds a variety of
regular meetings and conference calls with EPA officials to discuss
ongoing developments in specific subject areas. For example, ECOS
holds quarterly conference calls with the EPA's Deputy Administrator,
quarterly (or more frequent) calls between ECOS's subject-specific
committee heads and the corresponding EPA Assistant Administrator,
and an annual ECOS-EPA meeting to discuss the EPA's budget.140
The EPA and state interest groups also hold additional ad hoc
meetings-for example, ECOS visits the EPA every few months to
discuss pending joint initiatives and issues of common interest.141
d. The Plausibilityof State Influence
The foregoing account sets forth states' often-overlooked access
to federal agency decisionmaking. What of their influence? Empirical
studies are scarce,142 and measuring regulatory influence in any
136. See State/EPA Workgroup on Work Prioritization, supra note 133.
137. See, e.g., Ass'n of Clean Water Admins., supra note 133 ("Monthly State/EPA
Stormwater Call: The monthly State/EPA Stormwater Workgroup (SWWG) conference calls
continued this week with further discussion of options for the draft stormwater rule.").
138. See, e.g.,

ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,

SUSTAINABLE

MATERIALS MANAGEMENT

(2009)

(discussing state-EPA workgroup conclusions regarding waste and materials management).
139. See supra Part I.B.
140. EPA-STATE/ECOS JOINT ACTIVITIES, supra note 130.
141. Agenda, ECOS meeting with EPA officials (June 2012) (on file with author). Nina
Mendelson identifies an additional way that states may participate in the development of federal
regulation: by meeting with the OMB after an agency has submitted a proposal for centralized
review. Mendelson, supra note 20, at 778.
142. Others have recognized both the dearth of existing empirical evidence regarding state
influence and the difficulty in obtaining it. See Mendelson, supra note 20, at 758 (noting that
"not much evidence has been presented" and that it "may be difficult to collect in a reliable
form"); see also Metzger, New Federalism, supra note 20, at 2085 & n.225 (stating that
"surprisingly little empirical evidence exists on federal-state interactions in rulemaking," and
noting that "useful quantifiable data may be hard to produce'). As Mendelson notes, in the
absence of empirical evidence, the extent of state access to agency decisionmaking and the
incentives of agencies to listen constitute useful data points. See id. at 760.
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context is notoriously difficult. Still, leading federalism scholars have
opined that states do exert significant influence over federal agencies.
Daniel Elazar's seminal work posits that "many of the ostensibly
'Federal' rules applied to the states are really 'federal' in originshaped by the associations of professionals serving the states and
localities as well as the federal government, whose responsibility it is
to implement the very same programs." 143 In the legal literature,
Larry Kramer's leading scholarship explaining how federalism works
describes numerous reasons that states and state interest groups are
influential in Washington and with agencies in particular. 144 And in
the administrative federalism literature, although scholars have not
taken a uniform view on state influence, 145 some have recognized that
agencies have "significant incentives" to consider state interests. 146
Several factors make these conclusions quite plausible.
First, the regulatory interdependence described in Part II.C.2
often pushes agencies to heed states' input or to compromise with
them because agencies need to keep both their programs and their
relationships with states running smoothly. 147 State implementation
is often the federal government's only realistic option-as Kramer
notes, an agency cannot afford to take over all shared programs
itself.148 Nor can a federal agency afford a dysfunctional relationship
143. ELAZAR, supra note 45, at 164; see also, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 20, at 1973
("The states have proven to be effective at influencing agencies to preserve their state
prerogatives.").
144. See Kramer, Political Safeguards, supra note 112, at 284-85 (explaining that states
have influence over federal officials because the federal government depends on state officials to
implement federal programs); Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 112, at 1522
(listing "factors and processes that influence lawmakers to take the interests of state officials
and state institutions into account").
145. To the extent that administrative federalism scholars have expressed skepticism
regarding agencies' likelihood to heed to state input, it stems primarily from agencies' track
record of flouting the Federalism Order's consultation requirements. See Sharkey, supra note 20,
at 2138-39 (describing "a sufficiently entrenched pattern of disregard for state interests," and
noting studies showing agency failures to prepare federalism summary impact statements
pursuant to the Order); see also Metzger, New Federalism,supra note 20, at 2085-86 (pointing to
the studies reflecting agencies' poor track record with the Federalism Order as a possible reason
that "notice-and-comment rulemaking may not actually yield significant federalism benefits,"
and concluding that "the jury is still out"). As noted earlier, scholars have recognized that this
pattern may be starting to change, and in any event, there are numerous other channels for state
interaction with federal agencies.
146. E.g., Mendelson, supra note 20, at 769.
147. See ELAZAR, supra note 45, at 162.
148. Kramer explains:
[B]ecause the federal government depends so heavily on state officials to help
administer its programs,"-and because, "[r]ealistically speaking, Congress can
neither abandon these programs nor 'fire' the states and have federal bureaucrats
assume full responsibility for them, . . . [tihe federal government needs the states as
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with states; frequent disputes and litigation are disruptive and costly,
and they may imperil cooperation on shared tasks. Consider the EPA's
recent "tailoring rule," a regulation establishing a greenhouse gas
emissions threshold above which states must issue permits. States
argued that the rule was feasible for them only at a higher threshold
than the EPA had proposed, leaving the EPA a choice between
standing its ground and risking noncooperation by states, and
accommodating state concerns. The EPA chose the latter.149
Second, state and federal administrators often share similar
backgrounds and experiences that foster greater federal sensitivity to
state concerns. Many leaders in federal agencies previously worked in
state executive branches as governors or heads of state agencies.150 At
the EPA, for example, numerous recent administrators and their
deputies were previously governors or heads of state environmental
agencies.151 At the Department of Health and Human Services,
Secretary Kathleen Sebelius is both a former governor and a former
state insurance commissioner, and she has touted her familiarity with
state concerns throughout the implementation of the Affordable Care
Act.152
Third, federal administrators' political principals-the
President and Congress-are sometimes vocal spokespersons for state
interests in federal regulation. Scholars have well explored why this
occurs: 153 Presidents need to win state support in order to succeed in
the Electoral College, and many Presidents were themselves former
much as the reverse, and this mutual dependency guarantees state officials a voice in
the process.
Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism,supra note 112, at 1544.
149. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule
Step 3 and GHG Plantwide Applicability Limits, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,051 (July 12, 2012) (explaining
the need to set a higher emissions threshold because a lower one would not be feasible for
states); Becker & Royden-Bloom, supra note 17, at 10,777 (explaining state lobbying of the EPA
to set a threshold higher than originally proposed).
150. See Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism,supra note 112, at 1551-52.
151. See, e.g., Barry G. Rabe, Racing to the Top, the Bottom, or the Middle of the Pack? The
Evolving State Government Role in Environmental Protection,in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 30, 49
(8th ed. 2013) (noting that former EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson and current Administrator
Gina McCarthy, both former state environmental commissioners, "repeatedly emphasized their
desire to work collaboratively with each state rather than impose one approach from
Washington").
152. See, e.g., Letter from Sec'y Kathleen Sebelius, Health & Human Servs., to Governors
(Dec. 10, 2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/gov-letterfaqs-12-10-2012.pdf ("As both a former governor and state insurance commissioner, I believe that
states are in the best position to make decisions about their health insurance marketplaces.").
153. See ELAZAR, supra note 45, at 163; Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism,supra note 112,
at 1528-42; Kramer, Political Safeguards, supra note 112, at 278-87; Mendelson, supra note 20,
at 769-77.
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governors.15 4 And individual members of Congress have obvious
incentives to bring rewards to their home state and to avoid negative
impacts on home-state interests. This was the phenomenon at work,
for example, when a Wisconsin representative obtained an exemption
from restrictions on diesel emissions for ships on the Great Lakes. 55
In addition, "states' rights" sometimes becomes its own tagline,15 6 with
both Congress and the President trying to accommodate state
interests for political advantage.15 7 At least on politically salient
issues, pressure from Congress or the President may well constrain
federal agencies from ignoring or rejecting state positions.
Finally, there is the threat of judicial review. Although the
Federalism Order is not judicially enforceable, the key reviewing
courts-the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court-are plainly
sensitive to state interests and federalism concerns.15 8 As previously
noted, recent Supreme Court cases suggest that the Court may not
look kindly on agencies shutting states out of the regulatory process or
ignoring state comments.159 Indeed, that issue lurks in the background
of a case the Supreme Court will decide this Term involving the EPA's
high-profile Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (commonly called
"CSAPR"), which the D.C. Circuit struck down.o60 The states' circuit
court briefs and public statements argued, inter alia, that the EPA
had failed to consult them in setting the standards and that the
resulting rules were an unfair surprise.' 6 Although the D.C. Circuit's

154. See Mendelson, supra note 20, at 770.
155. See, e.g., Control of Emissions from New Marine Engines, 75 Fed. Reg. 22,896, 22,916
(Apr. 30, 2010) (granting certain exemptions to "existing steamships operating exclusively on the
Great Lakes"); Diana Marrero, Obey Measure Could Block New EPA Ship PollutionRegulations,
MILWAKUEE J.-SENTINEL (Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/64057622.html
(describing efforts by congressman David Obey to exempt Great Lakes ships from vessel air
pollution regulations).
156. See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Statehood As the New Personhood: The Discovery of
Fundamental "States' Rights," 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 213, 216 (2004) (discussing the
"renaissance" of states' rights in modern constitutional scholarship).
157. Mendelson, supra note 20, at 769.
158. Cf. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 20, at 1978 (opining that judicial review "can create
rather higher-powered incentives" for "agency deliberation about federalism," whereas executive
orders "offer at most rather low-powered incentives").
159. See supraPart II.A.
160. See EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding
that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority in its regulation of states' "good neighbor
obligations"), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2857 (2013).
161. State and Local Petitioners' Opening Brief at 42-56, Homer City, 696 F.3d 7 (No. 111302), 2012 WL 4754613; see also Press Release, Tex. Att'y Gen., Texas Scores Another Victory
Against EPA (Aug. 21, 2012), available at https://www.oag.state.tx.us/oagnews/
release.php?id=4126 (commenting on the D.C. Circuit's ruling on EPA's Cross-State Air Pollution
Rule).
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decision was framed on statutory grounds-that the Clean Air Act
does not authorize the EPA to set the standards at issue-the opinion
was sympathetic to the states' complaints, emphasizing the
cooperation necessary for "cooperative federalism" and accusing the
EPA of supplying insufficient notice and leeway to states.162
Immediately following the decision, House Science Committee
Chairman Ralph Hall released a statement applauding the ruling,
accusing the agency of basing the rule on an "EPA-knows-best"
approach and failing to consult with states or industry.163 Agencies,
then, can refuse to consult with and heed the states when developing a
federal rule, but they do so at some peril.
For all of these reasons, one can plausibly conclude that states'
special access to agencies through myriad structures and avenues for
state-federal interaction translate into at least some influence. The
Article turns next to the implications of that possibility.
III. TESTING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE STATE-CONSULTATION ROLE

This Part maps the state-consultation role in federal regulation
onto the leading models of administrative legitimacy. The analysis
shows how a strong version of the state role-one in which, as its
supporters advocate, agencies listen to states-runs counter to the two
most dominant models of legitimacy, presidential control and
expertise, as well as two earlier models.
Although administrative law scholarship has long fixated on
legitimacy, 164 the term's meaning has not always been clearly
defined.165 For some scholars, the principal legitimacy concern is
whether bureaucratic decisionmaking is consistent with democratic
values; some even conflate legitimacy and democracy, or refer to the
inquiry as one of "democratic legitimacy."166 Others express concern
that agency decisionmaking is incompatible with constitutional
values, in part because agencies wield unseparated powers of

162. Homer City, 696 F.3d at 33.
163. See Press Release, Chairman Hall Statement on the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule
(Aug. 21, 2012), available at http://science.house.gov/press-release/chairman-hall-statementcross-state-air-pollution-rule (applauding the invalidation of the rule).
164. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond

Accountability: Arbitrarinessand Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461,
462 (2003) ("From the birth of the administrative state, we have struggled to describe our
regulatory government as the legitimate child of a constitutional democracy.").
165. See, e.g., Fallon,supra note 8; Freeman, supra note 8.

166. Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative Law,
97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 856 (2012).
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lawmaking, adjudication, and enforcement.167 Some commentators
combine these concerns. 168 Perhaps the most encompassing
understanding of legitimacy links the term to public acceptance of
agencies and their authority.169
Over the past century, attempts to resolve the perceived
legitimacy problems have yielded four central accounts, or "models," of
administrative legitimacy, each focused on the involvement of a key
actor: Congress, bureaucrats, interest groups (and courts), and the
President. Each model has both descriptive facets, sketching
particular aspects of administrative decisionmaking, as well as
normative facets, identifying attributes or values that purportedly
legitimate the decisionmaking they describe.
The basic progression of the models, set forth in Richard
Stewart's seminal account and updated to the present, is familiar, 170
and this Part will recount that progression only briefly. In the early
era of administrative law, commentators depicted agency
decisionmaking as a "transmission belt" that merely carried
congressional intent into action; legitimacy stemmed from Congress
and the social contract with voters. 171 When open-ended New Deal
delegations to agencies made the transmission belt concept
implausible, a second approach cast administration as a science. 172
Under this expertise model, the discipline inherent in the objective
work of bureaucrats legitimated agencies from within. But this model
too emerged as inapt; few administrative decisions were purely
technical, and administrators were susceptible to influenceparticularly industry influence-as they made value judgments. That
observation spurred reforms toward a third model of "interest
representation," in which legitimacy stems from a quasi-legislative
process that accounts for all interests, not just those of powerful
regulated entities. 173 Yet scholars quickly realized that interest
participation did not solve (and could exacerbate) the power imbalance
among interested parties. Finally, in the most recent model, attention
167. See Allen, supranote 4.

168. See, e.g., David Arkush, Democracy and Administrative Legitimacy, 47 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 611, 612 (2012) (connecting legitimacy to "public perceptions of legality, propriety, and
efficacy").

169. See James 0. Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the Administrative Process, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1975); see also Freeman, supra note 8, at 557 ("At its core, the quest for
legitimacy might be understood as the pursuit of public acceptance of administrative
authority.").
170. See generally Kagan, supra note 3; Stewart, supra note 4.
171. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 1675.
172. See Kagan, supra note 3, at 2260-64; Stewart, supra note 4 at 1678.
173. See Kagan, supra note 3, at 2264-69.
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has shifted to the President and the legitimacy that stems from
centralized decisionmaking responsive to a national majority. 174
As described further below, each model and its associated
values still survives to varying degrees.175 Most scholars now agree
that the presidential control model is dominant, such that the
legitimacy of administrative action turns on agency adherence to the
President's direction and, by extension, to the preferences of the
national majority. In some tension with the presidential model,
variations of the expertise model place second: notwithstanding the
reverence for political control, many courts and scholars continue to
demand objective, apolitical decisionmaking by agencies. The values
associated with the models of congressional control and interest
representation also retain purchase, often as supplementary sources of
legitimacy. In addition to expertise or presidential control, agencies
must heed congressional will where that will is ascertainable, and
they must maintain, within reason, decisionmaking procedures open
and accessible to all. Figure 1 summarizes the four models of
legitimacy and the values associated with each.

174. See id. at 2246.
175. On the continued existence of the various models, see, for example, Bressman, supra
note 164, at 469 ("[E]ach model still exists today in some combination with the other models");
Kagan, supra note 3 (same); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97
HARv. L. REV. 1276, 1284 (1984) (noting that "current legal theorists often merge all four models
together"); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 437, 443-44 (2003) ("The earlier approaches have not disappeared. Administrative law has
been profoundly conserving.").
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Figure 1: Summary of Standard Models and Values of
Administrative Legitimacy
Model:

Transmission
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Expertise

Interest
Representation

Presidential
Control
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Agencies are a
mere extension
of Congress

Decisionmaking
by experts (as
opposed to
politicians) is
intrinsically
legitimate

Bargaining among
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quasi-legislative
process

Presidential
oversight makes
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the will of the
People

Values
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congressional
command

Apolitical,
independent,
expert reasoning

Transparency and
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helps avoid capture
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avoidance of
minority faction;
transparency
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This Part tests a strong form of the state-consultation role
against each model of legitimacy. The analysis focuses on the two
reigning models of presidential control and expertise; it then briefly
attends to interest representation and congressional control. Like
private actors, states will often act in ways that work at cross
purposes with the traits thought to make agencies legitimate. States
will often act in tension with the President, not merely in concert with
him; they will push political decisions, not merely expert ones; and
they will align themselves with private interests, not merely public
ones. And though states will not always undermine legitimacy models,
there is no way to tell ex ante, or often even at the time of state
consultation, whether they will do so. Administrative law scholars
should be clear-eyed about the risks to existing legitimacy models
posed by granting states special and often invisible access to the
federal regulatory process. It is time either to revisit the stateconsultation role or to update the models of legitimacy.
A word on methodology is in order. First, the assumptions and
values of each model are subject to some variation. The analysis
herein thus utilizes a streamlined version of each model that will not
necessarily track the views of all scholars associated with the model.
Second, for analytic clarity, this Article portrays each model sharply
and emphasizes the ways in which a strong state-consultation role
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undermines the model's key commitments. One might reasonably
object that any model can tolerate imperfections, such that the tension
created by state consultation is not fatal. The purpose here, however,
is to expose the disconnect between the project of making states
partners in federal agency decisionmaking and the conventional
understandings of legitimate bureaucratic action.
A. Presidentialism:Accountability and Responsiveness to National
Preferences
1. Tenets of the Presidential Control Model
The dominant model of administrative legitimacy is
presidential control.176 Described and defended powerfully by thenProfessor Kagan's article proclaiming the era of presidential
administration, this model ties legitimacy to democratic accountability
and to the will of the people.
Presidential control is thought to achieve accountability
through interrelated propositions of majoritarian responsiveness and
transparency. First, the President is responsive to the majority of the
American people because he caters to a national constituency-not
"merely parochial interests" 177-and cares about building his base. 7 8
Second, the transparency of presidential control makes accountability
meaningful. The public can observe and understand administrative
action because the President himself is a visible, familiar actor whose
work occurs largely under the public eye.179 If the public does not like
what it sees, the "clear lines of command" of presidential

176. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel
Before A New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 580 (2003) ("[Tlhe dominant version of
the principal-agent approach to the democratic legitimacy of administrative agencies is now the
presidential control model. . . ."); Staszewski, supra note 167, at 851; Bressman, supra note 164,
at 463; Farina, supra note 4, at 988.
177. Kagan, supra note 3, at 2335.

178. See id.; see also Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 35 (1995) (discussing the incentive of the President, as the only
nationally elected official, to address the needs of the majority of the American people). Although
this view is widely accepted, it is not without critics. Matthew Stephenson, for example, has
argued that presidentialism does not increase the majoritarian responsiveness of bureaucratic
policy. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L.

REV. 53, 64 (2008); see also Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the NationalistPresidentand the Parochial
Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1231-46 (2006) (challenging the conventional wisdom that the
President has a more national and less parochial outlook than Congress).
179. See Kagan, supranote 3, at 2332.
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administration make more feasible citizens' ability to check their
leaders. 80
As the foregoing suggests, the accountability that animates the
presidentialist understanding of legitimacy prizes majoritarian
adherence. 181 The model's most important premise and value is that
federal agencies should respond to "majoritarian preferences and
interests."182 And the model posits that the President, far better than
other overseers, achieves responsiveness.
A robust state-consultation role threatens the presidentialist
version of accountability-based legitimacy. It undermines the model's
two core assumptions: that agency decisions will track national
preferences and that agency decisionmaking will be transparent and
easy for the public to follow.
2. The Threat of State Consultation
a. Responsiveness to Majority Preferences
State influence jeopardizes agency responsiveness to the public
majority because states, unlike the President, necessarily respond to
locally bounded constituencies. Adding state influence to the work of
federal agencies therefore portends the opposite effect of centralizing
control under a nationally sensitive President. State consultation
creates the risk of faction or parochial interests that were thought to
plague earlier phases of the administrative process, on which the
presidential model sought to improve.
Two tendencies already discussed underscore the possibility
that state consultations will pull agencies away from majority
positions. First, political considerations will often lead individual
states to pursue home-state interests. In many cases, affected states
will be the only states to participate meaningfully in the federal
administrative process; even with broader participation, affected
states may speak loudest. Where vocal states diverge from the
preferences of a national majority, state influence is a force pushing
agencies toward factional positions and away from the national will.
Imagine, for example, that the President has determined in the wake
of high-profile coal-ash disasters that the nation wants regulation of
the waste product (a proposal discussed in greater detail below).183 Or

180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Bressman, supra note 164, at 490; Kagan, supra note 3, at 2335.
Kagan, supra note 3, at 2336.
See infra notes 214-26 and accompanying text.
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imagine that the President believes that a majority of the national
populace wants some federal regulation of fracking.'84 The input of
coal and fracking states may be (and indeed has proven to be) a
powerful check against such executive action. 85 Because less affected
states have less incentive to participate vocally in the process, the
industry-aligned state positions demand more attention. State interest
groups could, in theory, serve as a filter and channel only national
majority preferences to the agencies, but that correction does not occur
in practice.186
Second, even when state consultation conveys the considered
view of a majority or more of state officials, filtering state input
through state interest groups will often lead to positions that do not
track the preferences of the national public. State interest groups are
set up to represent states as institutions, not the interests of state
constituents. As discussed, when states within these groups disagree
on the merits of a proposal, they often converge on opposition to new
costs or restrictions on state government flexibility. 87 These concerns
often will not be shared by the general public, which tends to care
more about substantive policies than details of cost allocation or
administration.188 Accordingly, state interest groups may impose
checks on federal regulation even when the public prefers a federal
regulatory initiative. At the least, there is no logical or necessary
connection between state influence on agencies and the national
will.189
The presidential model's majoritarian commitment has been
substantially attacked, yet the state-consultation role would not
184. See Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and
Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691 (proposed May 11, 2012) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160)
(proposing to regulate hydraulic fracturing on public lands).
185. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Regulations on Fracking Are Revised, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/19/us/regulations-on-fracking-are-revised.html?_r=0
(noting that the Department of Interior will revise its proposed hydraulic fracturing regulations,
which were "opposed by oil companies and state officials"); see infra notes 214-26 and
accompanying text.
186. This is true for multiple reasons that I explore in a separate work. First, there appears
to be a tendency for states with little on the line not to oppose resolutions supported by affected
states, even if the people of those states likely would vote against the resolution. Second, because
state interest groups are one-state, one-vote, national majorities (measured by population) are
not necessarily represented by their votes in any event.
187. See supra Part III.A.
188. See Mendelson, supra note 20, at 764 (noting the view that "[i]ndividual voters may be
insensitive to the 'governance needs' of state and local institutions").
189. Pushing agencies away from majority preferences on the front end does not wholly
destroy the presidential model of responsiveness; it still leaves an ex post electoral check on the
President as a means to rein in undesirable agency action. But this alone is a weak and likely
unrealistic mechanism for responsiveness. See Staszewski, supra note 167, at 868.
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please even the model's critics. Lisa Bressman has articulated a
dominant critique, arguing that the presidential model's focus on
majoritarianism has harmfully decreased attention to the value of
rational decisionmaking and the absence of arbitrariness.190 A
presidential model reformed in light of this critique might require
agency decisions not only to track majority will but also to make sense
and protect minority rights. 191 State consultation is unlikely to help.
State parochialism may counteract the perceived tyranny of the
majority, but there is no reason to believe it will do so in a way that
safeguards rights or rationality. Instead, state pressure may simply
bestow outsized voice to powerful minority interests, replacing
majority faction with minority faction.192 State consultation might
then yield the worst of the presidential model: decreased
accountability and decreased rationality.
b. Transparency
Moving beyond majoritarian values, state consultation also
imperils the transparency values central to the executive control
model of legitimacy. Rather than facilitating clarity about how agency
decisions are made, state consultation adds layers of opacity. Indeed,
state consultation is not only less transparent than the presidential
model envisions but also less transparent than conventional interest
group input. State consultation occurs largely out of public view, and
the parochial interests states pursue are easily masked by federalism
language.
First, because agency-state interactions occur mostly in the
period before the rulemaking process begins and when ex parte
contacts need not be recorded, they exist largely in the rulemaking
"shade." 193 The phenomenon of opaque communications before a rule
proposal is not unique to states, to be sure-as many accounts
recognize, interested parties often avail themselves of the
pre-rulemaking stage to conduct more private (and thus more frank)
conversations with regulators. 194 Still, without a record of interactions

190. See Bressman, supranote 164, at 463-64.
191. See id. at 555.

192. See Neil K Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in a
Massive and Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REV. 657, 671 (1988) (defining and distinguishing
majoritarian and minoritarian bias).
193. See Wagner et al., supra note 44, at 109 (discussing pre-NPRM interactions as a form of
"rulemakingin the shade").
194. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 3, at 2360.
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between states and federal agencies, the public cannot separate the
desirable interactions from the bad.
Second, the FACA exemption means that agencies can consult
with states without adhering to the notice and disclosure
requirements that apply to other outside consultations. This
exemption produces an incongruity. Whereas agencies feel paralyzed
by time-consuming, expensive protocols when they seek input from
industry, scientists, or other groups, states can meet freely with state
leaders and receive input on regulatory proposals without disclosure.
Consequently, absent media attention, citizens will not know whether
it was state consultation that pushed the agency in a particular
direction. Nor will citizens know what positions their own state
officials advocated, since state officials can "bend the ears of federal
decisionmakers without publicity."195
Third, the capacious rhetoric of federalism, and the sensitivity
of judges and lawmakers to federalism values, may create a different
sort of transparency problem by obscuring states' underlying interests.
States will almost always be able to frame their positions in terms of
federalism values and may thereby garner respect or deference.1 96
Under the cover of those values, states may take positions designed to
protect home-state industry or politics without needing to fully air
their actual interests. 197 A state may use its comparably stronger
access to the agency, and its stronger credibility, to advance the views,
interests, and arguments of home-state industries.
State involvement in the debate over coal-ash regulation
provides an example of this transparency challenge. State opposition
to federal regulation of coal ash is almost certainly driven by homestate politics and industry, but states are able to couch their positions
in federalism language. In what Douglas Kysar has called "the most
hotly contested environmental, health, and safety issue in the Obama
Administration to date,"198 the EPA proposed in 2010 to regulate coal
195- Steven P. Croley & William F. Funk, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and Good
Government, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 451, 466 (1997).
196. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 81, 83 (2001) (describing the Supreme Court's "focus on state dignitary
interests").
197. This might be reason to worry about a form of the "conduit communications" Judge
Wald famously discussed in the renowned smoke-scrubbing case, Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d
298, 405 n.520 (D.C. Cir. 1981). There, the fear was that "administration or inter-agency contacts
serve as mere conduits for private parties in order to get the latter's off-the-record views into the
proceeding." Id.
198. Douglas A. Kysar, Commentary: Politics by Other Meanings: A Comment on 'Retaking
Rationality Two Years Later," 48 Hous. L. REV. 43, 52 (2011); see also Thomas 0. McGarity &
Rena I. Steinzor, The End Game of Deregulation: Myopic Risk Management and the Next
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ash, also known as coal combustion residuals ("CCRs"), the waste
matter that remains after pulverized coal is burned to generate power.
Electricity plants generate over 100 million tons of CCRs annually in
the United States, and the EPA has concluded that their accumulation
threatens surface and groundwater as well as human health.199 These
health concerns arise not only due to unlined waste units but also
from high-profile disasters. In the most significant recent example, the
Tennessee Valley Authority's Kingston Fossil Plant released over a
billion gallons of waste into a nearby community. 200
After the Kingston disaster, the EPA heeded calls to take
action and proposed to regulate coal ash as a hazardous waste. 201 After
OMB review, the EPA publicly proposed two alternative options:
regulation of coal ash as a hazardous waste under Subtitle C of the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act or as a nonhazardous waste
under Subtitle D of the Act. 202 The hazardous waste alternative
generated a firestorm of opposition from a coalition of states and
industry groups. Among their most emphatic claims, these groups
argued that designation of coal ash as hazardous would disastrously
impede "beneficial reuse" of the waste in concrete and other products.
This was so, the opponents argued, even though the proposal would
continue to exempt beneficially reused products from the hazardous
designation. According to these critics, the mere existence of a
hazardous designation for coal ash would "stigmatize" beneficial reuse
of the product. Critics attacked the stigma argument as mere pretext
for industry self-interest. Meanwhile, legislators have proposed at
least four bills in Congress-all framed as responses to the Obama
Administration's "war on coal"-to preclude a hazardous designation.

Catastrophe,23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 93, 112-36 (2012) (presenting case study of attempts
to regulate coal ash).
199. See LINDA LUTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42570, PROPOSALS To AMEND RCRA:
ANALYSIS OF PENDING LEGISLATION APPLICABLE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF COAL COMBUSTION

RESIDUALS 3-4 (2012) (noting that as much as 130 million tons of CCRs were generated in 2010,
and that the EPA's data showed potential threats to human health and the environment "when
the waste was managed in a way that lacked basic controls").
200. See id. at 3 (detailing the Kingston accident, where a breach in a surface impoundment
pond released 1.1 billion gallons of coal fly ash slurry over more than 300 acres); see also Shaila
Dewan, At Plant in Coal Ash Spill, Toxic Deposits by the Ton, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2008, at A14
(chronicling the breach and EPA's response).
201. See McGarity & Steinzor, supra note 198, at 114 (describing original EPA proposal and
OIRA review).
202. See Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128,
35,133-34 (proposed June 21, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 261, 264, 265, 268, 271
& 302) (describing two alternative proposals for regulating coal combustion residuals under the
Act).

2014]

STATES, AGENCIES, AND LEGITIMACY

487

The EPA, beleaguered by the controversy, has announced that there is
still no "definitive time" for release of a final rule. 203
States have been remarkably active in the coal-ash debate. In
addition to official consultations with the EPA pursuant to the
Federalism Order and the U1MRA in 2009,204 state interest groups
have submitted numerous comment letters, 205 enacted resolutions, 206
and lobbied for legislative intervention. 207 The groups frame many of
these comments in terms of regulatory burden and the desire for state
autonomy. Hazardous waste regulation would be more costly for
states, they argue, and would needlessly intrude upon existing state
programs. 208 States have also embraced and repeated the concerns of
the coal and cement industries, echoing the "stigma" argument 209 and
describing crippling economic effects the regulation could have on
important state industries. 210 Given the broader political picture and

203. See No Time Frame Set for Completing Final Coal Ash Regulations,EPA Says, 44 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 91 (Jan. 11, 2013) (quoting EPA assistant administrator Mathy Stanislaus).
204. See Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,226
(describing meetings).
205. See, e.g., Comment Letters, AsS'N ST. & TERRITORIAL SOLID WASTE MGMT. OFFICIALS,
http://www.astswmo.orgfPages/Policies-andPublications/ASTSWMOCommentLetters.html
(last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (collecting the Association's comments); Policy Letters, ENVTL.
COUNCIL STATES, http://ecos.org/section/policy/letters (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (collecting
letters written by the Council to various political actors).

206. See Resolution 08-14, The Regulation of Coal Combustion Residuals, ENVTL. COUNCIL
STATES, http://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/8005220/Resolutions/Resolution%2ONumber%200814%20CCR%20v2013.pdf (last modified Mar. 5, 2013) (arguing that "additional federal CCR
regulations would be duplicative of most state programs").
207. See, e.g., Letter of Support for the Coal Residuals Re-use and Management Act from R.
Steven Brown, Exec. Dir., Envtl. Council of the States, to John Shimkus, Chairman, House
Subcomm. on Env't & Econ. (Oct. 12, 2011), available at http://www.ecos.org/files/
4594_fileECOSLetter toShimkusonCCR.pdf (asserting that proposed changes to the Coal
Residuals Re-use and Management Act will afford states "a maximum of flexibility" in regulating
coal combustion residuals and will "assure the quickest implementation").
208. See, e.g., documents cited infra notes 209-10.
209. See Comment Letter on Proposed Rulemaking for Disposal of Coal Combustion
Residuals from Electric Utilities from R. Steven Brown, Exec. Dir., Envtl. Council of the States,
to EPA (Nov. 19, 2010), available at http://ecos.org/files/4303_- file CCWCommentLetterto_
EPANovember_2010.pdf (contending that additional federal regulation of coal combustion
residuals "should not be adopted" because state-level regulation is sufficient).
210. The legislative history of the proposed coal-ash bills in the House and Senate are replete

with such remarks. See, e.g., Rhetoric us. Reality: Does President Obama Really Support an "Allof-the-Above" Energy Strategy?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform,
112th Cong. 6 (2012) (statement of Sec'y Michael Krancer, Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Commw. of Pa.)
(stating that hazardous waste classification of coal ash would be "devastating in my State, and
other States, too. . . . There is no scientific justification for it; there is no legal justification for it.
It would cause the loss of between 180,000 jobs and 316,000 jobs and cost between $78 billion
and $110 billion over 20 years."); Jason Fordney, Investor Groups Say Coal Ash Is Hazardous,
ELECTRIC POWER DAILY, Sept. 16, 2010, at 2, availableat 2010 WLNR 19407122:
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the remarks of state officials, the debate appears to be motivated, in
large part, by states' consideration of their politics, economies, and
major industries. (It seems particularly unlikely that administrators
in coal states would have been free to support the EPA's hazardous
waste proposal, at odds with their political principals.) Yet framing
the discourse in terms of state autonomy and flexibility masks states'
underlying agendas.
One might respond to all of these transparency concerns by
noting that so long as the President continues to make the ultimate
decisions, the model's transparency is preserved. But this response
misses an important component of the presidential model: meaningful
transparency must allow not only visibility of the ultimate decision
but also comprehensibility-the ability to see not only what decision is
made, but also how and why. The presidential model's own adherents
would likely agree. As then-Professor Kagan explained in defending
the model, transparency fosters accountability when it allows the
public to understand how government actors have reached a given
decision.2 1' This value is compromised if a visible executive makes
decisions to accommodate invisible interests.
B. Expertise: Objectivity and Apolitical Decisionmaking
1. Tenets of Expertise-Based Legitimacy
Although the presidential model of legitimacy now dominates,
administrative law theory still celebrates the values of the expertise
model. 212
The expertise model traces back to James Landis, who
famously viewed administration as a scientific, objective endeavor in
In late July, Boucher and a majority of the House Energy and Commerce Committee
wrote EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson expressing concerns about the effect on jobs
and electricity rates of EPA regulation of coal ash. Reiterating arguments made by
coal industry interests in the long-running debate, the 31 Democrats and Republicans
from 22 states said EPA should not regulate coal ash as hazardous waste.
Press Release, Rep. Ed Whitfield, Whitfield Supports Kentucky Coal and Jobs, Votes to Reuse
Coal Ash Responsibly (Oct. 14, 2011), available at http://whitfield.house.gov/press-release/
whitfield-supports-kentucky-coal-and-jobs-votes-reuse-coal-ash-responsibly (proposing legislation
that would bar EPA from reclassifying coal ash as a hazardous waste, and stating that
"[c]ountless people across Kentucky make their living from Kentucky's coal industry and this
commonsense bill would ensure that we keep those jobs in place").
211. See Kagan, supra note 3, at 2332 (stating that "a fundamental precondition of
accountability in administration" is "the degree to which the public can understand the sources
and levers of bureaucratic action").
212. See, e.g., Watts, supra note 74, at 15-30 (describing continued judicial and scholarly
emphasis on expertise-driven decisionmaking, notwithstanding the widespread acceptance of the
presidential control model).
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which legitimacy flowed from administrators' professional expertise. 213
In a strong version of the expertise model, bureaucrats know how to
craft policies that advance the public interest, and this ability makes
political oversight unnecessary and undesirably constraining; the
constraints imposed by expertise suffice. 214 Such faith in expertise
rests on "characterizing agency decisions as technical and therefore
value-neutral."215 Indeed, a perceived dichotomy between expertise
and politics is a defining thread of expertise-based legitimacy. 216 The
fear is that politics will "displace the long-term view, 'scientific
knowledge[,] and professional experience' that seasoned bureaucratic
officials bring to the administrative enterprise."217
To be sure, the expertise model has its limits. Scholars no
longer share either Landis's view that administrative decisions are
wholly objective or his view that administration is a science. 218
Perhaps more importantly, the expertise model sometimes conflicts
with the presidential model: politically based decisionmaking is
anathema to the former but generally palatable to the latter.
Administrative law theorists have acknowledged, though not resolved,
this tension. 219

213. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 154-55 (1938).

214. Bressman, supra note 164, at 471 ("[R]ather than employing external
constraints..., the [expertise] model relied on internal ones."); Kagan, supra note 3, at 2261
(describing the expertise model and objections raised by its critics).
215. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in
Reviewing Agency Interpretationsof Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 90 (1994).
216. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American
Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 753 (1996) (noting that, in the mid-twentieth
century, "[t]he dominant understanding was that agency action was 'expert,' intended to operate
at some remove from politics"); see also Rachel E. Barkow, InsulatingAgencies: Avoiding Capture
Through InstitutionalDesign, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 20 (2010) ("Related to the goal of expertise is a
desire to insulate agency decisions from the sort of political horse-trading that is anathema to
impartial decision making. In this sense, expertise and nonpartisanship can be seen as two sides
of the same coin." (footnote omitted)).
217. Kagan, supranote 3, at 2353 (quoting Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers,
113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 696 (2000)). Kagan explains this fear but mostly rejects it, explaining
why political influence and administrative expertise can operate harmoniously. See id. at 235358.
218. See, e.g., id. at 2261 (noting that, while Landis viewed these questions as "matters of
fact and science," his critics found they involved "value choices and political judgment"); Stewart,
supra note 4, at 1678 (remarking that "many lawyers remained unpersuaded" by the expertise
model and "attacked the delegation of broad discretion to administrators"). Some have argued
further that administrative decisions are predominantly political. See Lawrence Lessig,
Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 435 (1995)
(describing a view that "administrative action" is "now seen by all to be essentially 'political' ").
219. See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political"Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108
MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1129 (2010) (describing scholars' arguments that administrative policy "may
not be particularly defensible and may even be outright tainted" if executive influence is

490

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:2:443

Despite these limitations, vestiges of the expertise model
remain prominent in administrative law. 2 2 0 Many modern scholars
praise expertise as a necessary administrative virtue and contrast it
with the corrosive effect of raw politics. Justice Stephen Breyer is the
most well-known, arguing that highly trained bureaucrats should
guide the regulatory state, insulated from politics and permitted to
deploy their expertise to improve public policymaking. 221 Courts, too,
have placed great value on administrative expertise, both by
identifying it as a basis for judicial deference 222 and by rejecting
decisions that seem inadequately expert or excessively political. The
Supreme Court's seminal decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. 2 23 has been "widely
read over time to represent the triumph of expertise to the exclusion of
politics," 224 and the Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA225 is best
understood as an attempt "to ensure that agencies exercise expert
judgment free from outside political pressures." 226 The D.C. Circuit,
known for its expertise in administrative law, also calls for agency
decisionmaking to deploy expertise to the exclusion of political
pressure. 227
States have the potential to enhance expertise, but they should
also be expected to undermine the expertise model's values by
advancing political agendas. A particular trouble, owing to the
involved); Watts, supra note 74, at 73-85 (detailing "objections to giving politics a place" in
agency decisionmaking but concluding that "ultimately, none of them prove insurmountable").
220. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 99-100 (1994) (noting that "the importance of expertise in providing the
foundation for sound public judgments" remains "an enduring theme in administrative law");
Watts, supra note 74, at 30 (noting that "many scholars seem to accept the desirability of our
current system's focus on expertise and science," and others "have spoken affirmatively about the
virtues of expertise and insulation and the negative aspects of politics").
221. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 61 (1993).
222. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66
(1984); cf. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)
(stating that a court should be "at its most deferential" when an agency makes decisions "within
its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science"). For commentary, see generally Emily

Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J.
1763, 1771 (2012) (describing the "important role" of expertise "as an anchor of regulatory
legitimacy that has shaped the relationship between courts and agencies").
223. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
224. Watts, supranote 74, at 19.
225. See 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007) (rejecting the EPA's "laundry list of reasons not to
regulate," which included the President's priorities).
226. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise,
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52.
227. See Aera Energy LLC v. Salazar, 642 F.3d 212, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (describing a line of
cases in which "politics has impermissibly infected an agency decision"). I discuss Aera Energy
infra notes 247-53.
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transparency challenges noted earlier, is that the public cannot easily
discern which type of input states are providing.
2. The Perils of State Influence for Expertise-Based Legitimacy
In the abstract, state consultations should be a gold mine for
the expertise ideal. Courts and scholars celebrate the notion that
states' local knowledge and experiences as "laboratories of
democracy" 228 can improve decisionmaking. In the context of the
federal regulatory process, the hope is that state input will enhance
ins
agency expertise by helping federal administrators understand the
229 as
states,
and outs of problems that manifest differently in different
well as the costs and viability of potential solutions. 230 Moreover,
states can speak from their own regulatory experience in devising
solutions, a form of expertise that most other interested groups lack,
231
and their status as "policy entrepreneurs" may enrich their input.
For example, California has educated the federal government and

228. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may . .. serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.").
229. See, e.g., DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 2-7 (2d ed.
2004); cf. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of DemocraticExperimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 374 (1998) ("[It is necessary to take full account of local topography, wind
conditions, and economic activity to determine the exposure of a particular population to various
environmental risks.").
230. See generally Young, supra note 20, at 889 ("[T]here are likely to be some questionssuch as how to adapt general directives to local conditions-on which state regulators have an
edge."). The importance of local knowledge is paradigmatic in environmental regulation, in which
local conditions like wind patterns and geographical terrain matter in establishing
environmental policy," yet often "[n]ational standards fail to capture the nuances of these local
conditions." Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalismand Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097,
1106 (2009) (summarizing arguments of devolution proponents). See also Alaska Dep't of Envtl.
Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 488 (2004) ("A state agency, no doubt, is best positioned to
adjust for local differences in raw materials or plant configurations . . . .").
231. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19-22 (2007) (describing key role of state and
local politicians as "natural policy entrepreneurs who can significantly influence what sorts of
conditions are publicly recognized as problems"). One standard explanation for state innovation
is that states are said to compete with one another for residents and capital. See, e.g., Michael W.
McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1498 (1987)
(reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)) (describing the
phenomenon of innovation through competition). Hills offers several additional reasons: state
politicians need to make a name for themselves in order to challenge federal incumbents in
political races, state politicians have greater innovative flexibility because they can more easily
externalize the costs of their policies to other states, and different constituencies and interest
groups in different states lead to policies that are not coextensive with the federal policy agenda.
See Hills, supra,at 19-22.
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other states in air pollution regulation, 232 and Wisconsin has been a
leader in the welfare context. 233
In practice, however, state consultation and expertise-based
legitimacy are on a collision course. First, states acting individually
are naturally driven by their home-state interests, 234 prioritizing
politics over expertise where the two conflict. As Denise Scheberle
observes in her study of state and federal interactions in the
implementation of environmental laws, states often advocate to the
federal government the interests of "economically important
industries within state boundaries." 235 States' concern for home-state
industries does not itself imply capture or wrongdoing, since industry
interests may align with the state's democratic will or a public
interest, but state advocacy of industry interests may nonetheless
draw agencies away from expert decisions. Second, state interest
groups tend to submerge the diversity of state knowledge and
experience in favor of uniform, lowest common denominator positions.
Because the expertise model of legitimacy prizes expertise and
information gathering, and eschews reliance on extrastatutory,
politically rooted considerations, both of these tendencies undermine
the model. 236
A few examples will illustrate. Consider instances of states
advocating individually regarding agency decisions that implicated
only their state. In Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
v. EPA, 2 37 a dispute regarding a Clean Air Act permit for Alaska's Red
Dog Mine, the career engineering staff at Alaska's environmental
agency initially found that the Act required use of a stringent
technology. The mine, however, disagreed, and the state agency
ultimately rejected the staff's view and sided with the mine. As the
Court observed, the mine was "the region's largest private employer,"
232. On California's extensive experience as an air pollution "super-regulator," see Carlson,
supranote 230, at 1110.
233. See, e.g., Young, supra note 23, at 55 & n.262 (collecting sources describing Wisconsin's
welfare program as a precursor to federal welfare reform). Young and the sources he cites also
identify dozens of other areas, from public education to election procedures, in which state policy
innovation has informed federal programs. See id. at 55 & n.264 (citing Barry Friedman, Valuing
Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 399 (1997), and DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM 87-88 (1995)).
234. See supra Part III.B.
235. SCHEBERLE, supra note 229, at 39; see also id. ("In the face of pressure from these
regional or state economic powerhouses, it is no surprise that state officials are likely to be more
sensitive to the costs associated with regulatory compliance than are their federal colleagues.").
236. See, e.g., Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 226, at 64 (describing concern over whether
the EPA decision at issue in Massachusetts v. EPA was "in fact the product of expertise-a
decision supported by the scientific evidence-or whether it was an instance of politics overriding
scientific judgment").
237. 540 U.S. 461 (2004).
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supplying "a quarter of the area's wage base." 238 During a protracted
back-and-forth debate with the EPA over the permissibility of the
state agency's decision, the Court noted, the state agency "candidly
stated" that it aimed "[t]o support" the mine's "Production Rate
Increase Project, and its contributions to the region."239 The state
agency's conclusion rested not on a technical judgment regarding
feasibility or costs-indeed, the agency conceded that it had made "no
judgment .. . as to the impact of ... [the technology] on the operation,
profitability, and competitiveness of the Red Dog Mine"240-but rather
on the influence of the mine and the needs of the region. 241
Another high-profile example of a state advancing localindustry interests to federal regulators based apparently on state
political (nonexpert) considerations involves the listing of the polar
bear as threatened under the Endangered Species Act. Ever since the
plight of the snail darter halted construction of the Tellico Dam,
listing a species under the Act has tended to evoke opposition from
industry and developers. 242 Likely fearing development constraints,
state environmental officials in Alaska discouraged the Fish and
Wildlife Service from listing the polar bear. That attempt was
unsuccessful, but the in-state dynamics were telling. The state
officials told a local newspaper that "Congress should reform [the Act]
by giving states equal deference in listing decisions rather than single
federal agencies with biologists who might have agendas." 243
Environmental advocates see Alaska's opposition to the listing
decision as "clearly show[ing] how close the state's ties are to the
resource extraction industry."244 The D.C. Circuit ultimately rejected
Alaska's challenge to the listing.245
Another example reflects that state politics will not always
favor industry. Consider here the fascinating case of Aera Energy v.
238. Id. at 474.
239. Id. at 497-98.
240. Id. at 497.
241. See, e.g., Carrie Gombos, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. E.P.A.,
28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 545-46 (2004):
ADEC's selection of Low NOx technology for the Mine demonstrates how state
agencies can succumb to industry pressure. . . . ADEC supported the Mine's choice of
the less stringent and less costly technology because of Cominco's economic clout, even
though ADEC was aware that it did not have an adequate justification for its choice.
242. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
243. Dan Joling, Alaska Officials Pan Endangered Species Law, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS

(Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.adn.com/2011/11/15/2173091/alaska-officials-pan-endangered.html.
244. Id. (quoting Rebecca Noblin of the Center for Biological Diversity).
245. See In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & Section 4(d) Rule Litig.-MDL
No. 1993, 709 F.3d 1, 17-18 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Safari Club Int'l v. Jewell, 2013
WL 3948014 (U.S. 2013).
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Salazar,246 which featured unusually frank disclosures by both state
and federal regulators of the interests they sought to advance. In that
case, the now-eliminated Minerals Management Service within the
Department of Interior was required to decide whether to extend
certain oil and gas leases off the coast of California. Reportedly "[a]s a
result of increasing hostility in California toward offshore oil
development," 247 California officials urged the agency to terminate the
leases. Specifically, "[California's] Governor, other State and local
officials, including California Coastal Commission members, and
various Congressional members expressed opposition to or concern
over development of the" leases. 248 The governor "had expressed strong
opposition" to further development of the leases and supported a
moratorium; Senator Diane Feinstein further urged termination of the
leases on the ground that "Californians strongly oppose oil drilling off
our coast."249
The Minerals Management Service's Pacific Regional Director
charged with making the decision testified later that "his decision was
based not on the merits, but on politics." 2 50 As the D.C. Circuit retold
the tale, the Regional Director's supervisor informed him that "it
'would be politically very important to cancel some of the tracts' as a
show of 'good faith to California officials,'" and that terminating the
leases in question would help the supervisor 'in carrying on the
credibility of the region and her work in Washington." 251 The Regional
Director "explained that absent these political considerations, he
would have reached the opposite decision." 252
State consultations may also undermine the expertise model
when states are in conflict with one another, because they may
pressure the agency to broker a deal based on politics rather than
through neutral expertise. Consider here the example of emissions
regulation, where states' interests vary with their upwind or
downwind status, or based on their dominant industry. In Sierra Club
v. Costle,253 the D.C. Circuit reviewed the EPA's attempt to regulate

246. 642 F.3d 212, 215-16 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
247. Opening Brief of Appellants at 23, Aera Energy, 642 F.3d 212 (Nos. 10-5101, 10-5110),
2010 WL 4234745.
248. Aera Energy, 642 F.3d at 216-17.
249. Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 248, at 23-24.
250. Aera Energy, 642 F.3d at 216 (quoting the Regional Director's deposition).
251. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
252. Id. The court ultimately upheld the agency's decision because a neutral internal review
body, the Interior Board of Land Appeals, had later reached the same decision for apolitical
reasons.
253. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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emissions of sulfur dioxide and particulate matter from certain
stationary sources. As Justice Scalia glibly remarked, "[W]hat was
really going on was a dispute between the high-sulphur states and the
low-sulphur states.

. .

. I mean, if you thought that formula was

scientifically arrived at and was not the product of a political
compromise between the high-sulphur states and the low-sulphur
states, you believe in Santa Claus."254
The foregoing examples highlight the parochial, politically
motivated input of individual states that participate in the regulatory
process. When agency rulemakings implicate the interests of many or
all states, and state interest groups get involved, state consultations
may present a different type of problem for the expertise model. As I
address elsewhere, the groups' governance structure and need to
advocate a singular position steer them away from conveying the
localized information and detail valued by the expertise model. 255
Instead, the groups tend to cohere around more general positions
focused on "the autonomy, fiscal viability, and integrity of the
particular level of government they speak for."256
Again, this critique does not make state involvement in
rulemaking necessarily more problematic for the expertise model than
the involvement of other interest groups. The "battle between
expertise and politics" 257 is a familiar legitimacy problem, not a novel
one. Yet if state involvement will deepen rather than resolve the
battle between expertise and politics, and will raise the same
legitimacy problems that administrative law has long feared from
other interest groups, affording states privileged access to agency
decisionmaking is a fraught proposition. The expertise-based critique
of state consultation thus urges reflection upon the call for a special
state role in the federal regulatory process.
Moreover, some aspects of the state-consultation role may
present unique concerns to legitimacy scholars who fear the elevation
of politics over expertise. The prescription for that fear is usually
sunshine: if courts and citizens can view and identify the inputs to
agency decisionmaking, they can then distinguish the political from
the expert. But as described in the earlier discussion of transparency,
the state-consultation role does not afford such monitoring. Not only

254. Antonin Scalia, The Role of the Judiciary in Deregulation,55 ANTITRUST L.J. 191, 19798 (1986).
255. See Seifter, supra note 26.
256. HAIDER, supra note 12, at 214-15.
257. Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines at the Crossroadsof Politics and Expertise,
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1601 (2012).
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do state consultations occur largely invisibly, off the record, and
without the disclosure that FACA requires for other consultations, but
the language of federalism and state autonomy often masks when
state input is based on political considerations. 258 Federalism values,
respected throughout government and across political parties, tend to
protect state input from critique. 259
C. Fidelity to CongressionalCommand
Although presidential control and expertise now dominate the
legitimacy landscape, administrative law retains values from two
earlier models of legitimacy: congressional control and interest
representation. This Section briefly addresses the implications of state
consultation for each of these models and their associated values,
taking congressional fidelity first.
The "traditional" model of agency behavior posits that Congress
controls agency decisionmaking; agencies are mere "transmission
belts" that channel congressional preferences into regulatory
outputs.2 60 According to this view, administrative action is legitimate
because it merely operationalizes decisions by Congress, whose
legitimacy is established by social contract theory. 261 The broad
statutory delegations of the New Deal era plainly rendered this model
inapt, because Congress entrusted vast discretion to agencies. 262 It is

258. One might argue that even this problem is not unique to states. Private interest groups
may not be able to advance their positions in terms of federalism values, but they often argue
based on science or other ostensibly apolitical values. The underlying interests of private groups,
however, are more often apparent, and scientific or other apparently apolitical input coming from
private interest groups is often treated with skepticism.
259. Nor are there discrete subject areas in which state lobbying can be assumed to be
apolitical. One might argue that highly technical areas are most conducive to state-federal expert
collaboration. But even in the context of drinking water standards, which are often
overwhelming in their technical detail, states take political positions-in the sense that they are
driven by sensitivity to economic impacts on their home industry rather than on the effects on
human health. See generally SCHEBERLE, supra note 229 (describing state opposition to
tightening of the arsenic standard); Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J.
2255, 2257 (2002) (describing controversy over the regulation of arsenic).
260. The "transmission belt" phrase was coined by Richard Stewart in his seminal account of
administrative law's evolution. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 1675 (stating that the traditional
model of administrative law envisions agencies as a transmission belt for implementing
congressional directives).
261. See id. at 1672 (discussing association of the "traditional" model with the contractarian
work of Hobbes and Locke).
262. See id. at 1677 (stating that the sweeping powers delegated to agencies by New Deal
legislation made obvious the breadth of agency discretion); see also Mashaw, supra note 4, at 2223 (noting that "the vacuity of statutory terms stretches the thread that binds administrative
action to electoral preferences virtually to the breaking point").
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now implausible to expect, as the transmission belt model envisions, a
"one-to-one correlation ... between congressional intent and agency
action."263
In recent years, some scholars have renovated the
transmission belt model to create a new story of congressional control
of agency decisionmaking. Positive political theorists, in particular,
have described mechanisms-referred to as police patrols and fire
alarms-by which Congress can control agencies to produce desired
policy outcomes. 264 Other scholars posit that Congress is more
involved in administration than even the positive political theorists
suggest. 2 65 Although this work is rich and provocative, it has not
restored congressional control as the dominant view of agency
legitimacy, perhaps because its plausibility remains contested. 266
Notwithstanding the abandonment of the transmission belt
account and the continued debate over congressionally designed
control mechanisms, the basic underlying value-that agencies should
adhere to congressional will-is uncontroversial. Disregard of
congressional will is understood as illegitimate both in the sense of
being unlawful or ultra vires, 267 and also in the sense of being
undemocratic. Thus, fidelity to congressional command remains a key
starting point for inquiries into administrative legitimacy. Any force
driving agencies away from what Congress has required is
problematic for administrative law theorists.
263. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 586
(1985).
264. See Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165 (1984) (describing congressional
control over agencies); see also Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431,
432 (1989) (discussing the importance of administrative structures in assuring that
administrative adherence to congressional preferences).
265. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, CongressionalAdministration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61,
67 (2006) (detailing Congress's oversight and involvement in administration, including through
periodic reports from agencies to Congress, numerous hearings, and the efforts of the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) to uncover problems).
266. See, e.g., David B. Spence, Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer
Administrative Agencies, 28 J. LEGAL STuD. 413, 418-19 (1999) (describing the lack of empirical
support for the structure and process hypothesis, and the difficulty of obtaining it); JERRY L.
MASHAw, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 23-30 (1997) (describing challenges to positive
political theory).
267. See La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (an agency "literally has no
power to act .. . unless and until Congress confers power upon it'). This, of course, is also a pillar
of Chevron and its progeny. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984) ("First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress.").
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This does not bode well for a strong version of state
consultation. The interests states pursue in the federal regulatory
process do not necessarily connect to the content of congressional
commands. To be sure, states are sometimes motivated by
organizational mandates or missions that happen to align with
congressional design. If, for example, California's Air Resources
Board, known for its environmental protection achievements,
vigorously presses tighter emission restrictions, one might argue it
does so in harmony with the purpose of the Clean Air Act. 268 But state
administrators' mandates and missions often point against
congressional intent. Moreover, states can be expected to pursue
home-state political agendas and defend their regulatory authority,
neither of which has any logical link to the content of the federal
statute. A state agency's desire for less onerous monitoring
requirements may well undermine a federal statutory program, and
industry-driven state politics may do the same. Whatever the
alignment in a particular case, all of this is to say that state interests
should not be expected to track, and may often diverge from,
congressional commands.
D. Interest Representation: Openness and the Struggle Against Capture
Like the transmission belt model, the interest representation
model is now mostly described as a stage in administrative law's
history, not a live theory. Yet its values, too, retain a place in
administrative law dialogues. State consultation has the potential to
advance those values, but it often threatens them-and it will be
difficult to tell ex ante which will occur.
The model was a response to fears of agency capture in the
1960s-fears that regulated entities acquired control of (or at least
heavily influenced) agency decisions to the detriment of intended
regulatory beneficiaries. 269 Reformers rooted in ideals of pluralism and
268. Jessica Bulman-Pozen has described how states may sometimes check "a wayward
federal executive branch" by "cast[ing] themselves as faithful agents of Congress, seeking to
carry out a statute as Congress intended." Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalismas a Safeguard of
the Separationof Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 489 (2012).
269. E.g., Merrill, supra note 9, at 1043 (stating that judicial fears of agency capture in the
late 1960s prompted judges to seek out ways to "force[] agencies to open their doors-and their
minds-to formerly unrepresented points of view"); see also, e.g., Garland, supra note 263, at
510-11 (noting that concern that the intended beneficiaries of regulatory programs were "grossly
underrepresented in the process of agency decisionmaking" was a motivation behind the interest
representation model.). Capture continues to receive scholarly attention, including in a recently
published volume. See PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND

How To LIMIT IT (Carpenter & Moss eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2013).
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openness hoped to achieve legitimacy through a "surrogate political
process" that would "ensure the fair representation of a wide range of
affected interests."270 The goal, similar to that of John Hart Ely in the
constitutional context, 271 was to give voice to those who had previously
not been heard. 272 Reforms took shape in judicial developments,
including expanded standing for regulatory beneficiaries, 273 and in
federal statutes aimed at public access to administrative process,
including the Freedom of Information Act, FACA, and the
Government in the Sunshine Act. 274
Interest representation was soon rejected as a unifying
legitimacy model, for the surrogate political process only replicated
existing power imbalances and gave unappealing weight to private
bargaining. 275 Still, courts and commentators continue to insist on
(1) decisionmaking that gives consideration to any interested party,
particularly those diffuse public beneficiaries who traditionally have
had less voice in the administrative process, and (2) transparency, a
value shared with the presidential model. 276 Each of these
commitments safeguards against capture. Many worry that the
administrative process falls short of these goals and that disparities in

270. Stewart, supra note 4, at 1670, 1712.
271. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 135 (1980).
272. Mashaw, supra note 4, at 115; see also Bressman, supra note 164, at 484 (comparing
interest representation to Ely's approach). Thus, the interest representation model, like the
presidential model discussed earlier, and unlike the expertise model discussed previously, links
legitimacy to majority will. Because the interest representation model was particularly focused
on eliminating the ills of capture, however, I focus on that value in this discussion.
273. See Stewart, supra note 4, at 1729-30 (describing expansion of standing doctrine). For a
discussion of other judicial developments, see, for example, Garland, supra note 263, at 576.
274. See William Funk, Public Participationand Transparencyin Administrative Law-Three
Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 174 (2009) (discussing statutes intended
to increase transparency and public participation).
275. Sunstein, Factions,supra note 9, at 283-84:
[The interest representation model] foundered in light of four considerations: the fact
that the relevant representatives were self-selecting; the weaknesses in the notion
that the purpose of administration is to aggregate preferences; the unlikelihood that,
even if preference-aggregation were desirable, it would be accomplished by a
judicially-administered system of interest-representation; and the possibility that
such procedures would impose costs not justified by improvements in administrative
outcomes.
See also Kagan, supra note 3, at 2359 (noting that the "relegation of government officials to the
status of brokers . .. transforms administration into a dispenser of rents and amplifies all that
Americans find most distasteful in government").
276. Wendy Wagner et al. have gone so far as to state that "there are few disagreements that
[interest representation] is currently the method of choice in administrative law." Wagner et al.,
supra note 44, at 100-01.
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influence corrupt regulation. 277
In the abstract, states could potentially allay interest
representation theorists' fear of capture and the underrepresentation
of "public interests" 27 8 in the regulatory process. 2 79 States, after all,
represent an entire populace, including the diffuse interests thought
to be underrepresented in federal administration. But such
representation proves unreliable when states enter into the
administrative process. As noted earlier, political pressure frequently
pushes state administrators to lobby federal agencies for the interests
of home-state industry. 280 Returning to the coal-ash example, it should
not be surprising that coal states vociferously oppose classification of
their core industry's waste product as hazardous. The coal industry is
essential to the economy in those states. So too with the examples in
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation and the polar bear
listing. A similar story could play out in states dominated by farming
or the auto industry. 281 And when state interest groups come together
in favor of state autonomy, they may form ad hoc coalitions with likeminded industry groups. All of this behavior in the federal regulatory
process can exacerbate, not cure, the disparities between "public" and
private interests.
Relaxing the assumption of state officials' democratic
responsiveness to their constituents heightens the risk that states will
exacerbate inequality in federal regulatory participation. Public choice
theory posits that administrators are engaged in a system of private
bargains with powerful groups, dispensing regulatory benefits in
exchange for political support. 282 According to public choice theory,
states would systematically side with affluent, well-organized industry
groups, thereby creating powerful coalitions opposed to regulations
that benefit the diffuse public. This tendency may be more pronounced

277. See, e.g., Steinzor & McGarity, supra note 198, at 98 (arguing "that regulated industries
dominate regulatory debates on Capitol Hill and at the federal agencies to an unprecedented
extent").
278. Following convention, I use "public interest" to refer to interests in the general welfare
that are often underrepresented in the political process. For a discussion of the phrase's
meaning, see, for example, STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 57 & n.11
(2008).
279. See Wagner et al., supra note 44, at 141 (noting that, "[g]iven [states'] higher rate of
activity" in commenting on proposed rules, "if states are serving predominantly as public interest
advocates, then this ... suggests a more formidable public interest presence than is revealed by
considering public interest group engagement, standing alone").
280. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
281. Cf. Levinson, supra note 52, at 941 (providing an example involving farm states and
farm subsidies).
282. See, e.g., MASHAW, supra note 266, at 13-22.
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among state rather than federal officials; some scholars have
suggested that states are more likely to be dominated by a particular
industry group, and less likely to hear from strong "public-interest"
groups, than the federal government. 283
IV. CONCLUSION: REFORMS, CONVERGENCE, AND THE PATH AHEAD

Administrative law, commentators have noted, is always one
step behind. 284 That proves to be the case for the relationship between
states and federal agencies. Although the administrative federalism
literature has insightfully contemplated ways in which these
relationships may advance federalism values or state autonomy,
scholars of the administrative process have yet to grapple with how
state involvement in agency decisionmaking comports with the values
long believed to make administrative decisions legitimate.
This Article has shown that states already possess significant
and privileged access to federal agency decisionmaking, and it has
posited that there are reasons to believe that states possess some
influence in those decisions. Further, the Article has shown that there
is tension between a strong state role in shaping federal agency
decisions and the dominant understandings of administrative
legitimacy. States may drive agencies away from national preferences,
and may do so in opaque or invisible ways; they may give input based
on politics, not expertise; and they may channel special interests, not
just public interests.
This final Part begins to illuminate the way forward by briefly
sketching two types of reforms. First, this Part identifies changes that
could move the state-consultation role closer to conventional
legitimacy values. Second, this Part identifies the possibility of new
legitimacy values that might better accommodate a state role. To some
extent, choosing which of these paths to follow, and how far down
them to proceed, will depend on one's normative commitments. A
federalism proponent who cares only about advancing state power
283. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1213 (1977)
(suggesting that environmental groups are often more effective at the national level); Carlson,
supra note 230, at 1104 ("Observers have suggested that the federal government is less subject to
public choice pathologies than many states, which may be dominated by a particular industry
group and may lack the strong presence of environmental advocacy groups."). But see Richard L.
Revesz, Federalismand Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV.
553, 636-41 (2001) (rejecting the position that public choice pathologies are less serious at the
federal level).
284. See generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS (1988) (describing the
reactive nature of administrative law).
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might favor a strong state-consultation role in spite of its potential
costs to legitimacy, whereas some dedicated legitimacy proponents
might seek to limit the state role to safeguard legitimacy, regardless of
the potential impact on state interests. Yet the tension between state
access to the regulatory process and legitimacy values does not
necessarily mark an impasse; modest reforms in both directions are
likely to be widely palatable.
Enhancing transparency would begin to harmonize state
consultations with existing legitimacy values. There are several ways
to achieve this reform. Congress could eliminate the state FACA
exemption altogether or could scale it back. Even if consultations
between states and federal agencies need not satisfy the full advisory
committee protocol of balanced perspectives and charters, agencies
ought to docket and document state consultations. On this point,
proposals for greater state transparency might be informed by
scholarship seeking to increase the visibility of the President's role in
agency decisionmaking. Nina Mendelson, for example, has argued that
disclosure requirements might require an agency "to docket and make
publicly available written rulemaking materials" it has received from
the OMB, "to summarize the critical details of" key conversations with
reviewing executive officials, "and [to] explain the extent to which
those positions are connected to the agency's ultimate decision." 285
Similar requirements, imposed by statute or executive order, could
require documentation and disclosure of agency input from states.
State-centered reforms, too, could advance transparency goals.
The National Governors' Association, or a federal entity like the
Administrative Conference of the United States, could develop a set of
best practices for transparency in agency-state interactions. These
practices might involve state disclosure to constituents of the positions
that states advocate to agencies, perhaps through a state executive
branch website.
These reforms would alleviate some transparency concerns but
would not resolve them fully. As this Article has described, the merits
and motivations underlying state advocacy are easily submerged in
federalism rhetoric and can therefore be difficult to tease out. Judicial
review provides another tool to address this problem. "Hard look"
review, in particular, might help separate reasonable agency
acceptance of state input from agency surrender to raw politics-and
might in turn incentivize more deliberative agency decisionmaking. 286
285. Mendelson, supra note 219, at 1164.
286. See Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 1547 (advancing a civic republican model under which
"the court's proper function is to ensure that the agency interpreted the statute in a deliberative
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Rather than awarding deference because agencies have consulted with
states, as some administrative federalism literature suggests, 287 courts
might advance legitimacy more effectively by hinging deference on an
agency's meaningful explanation of its response to state input.
It is worth noting that all of these reforms are likely to inhibit
somewhat the advancement of state power. As I explain elsewhere,
state interest groups' sturdy commitment to defending state power is
facilitated by the fact that the groups are not subject to public
scrutiny; member states need not worry about disapproval from their
constituents or political party. 288 Submitting the entire stateconsultation process to the public eye may introduce political
inhibitions that discourage states from pursuing a purely states-rights
agenda. Still, this incremental change seems likely to be widely
acceptable as a limited price to pay for a more accountable process.
Approaching the tension from the other side, scholars should
also begin to discuss new approaches to administrative legitimacy that
would incorporate values of administrative federalism. A new model
might focus not on apolitical expertise or majority responsiveness but
instead on checking the power of federal agencies. 289 Outside the
administrative context, of course, a traditional argument for
federalism is that the diffusion of power limits tyranny and protects
individual rights. Perhaps recreating Madison's "double security" 290
within the administrative process would hold similar appeal;
legitimacy would come not from centralized control but from
decentralized control-not from the agility and responsiveness of a
single overseer, but from the competition of multiple overseers with
different perspectives. 2 91 States might check the federal
administration and thereby guard against excessive executive

manner"); see also Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 9, at 61 (describing how the "hard-look"
doctrine has transformed administrative decisionmaking).
287. See supra note 34 (describing suggestions that judicial deference should depend in part
on whether the agency engaged in meaningful consultations with states).
288. See Seifter, supra note 26.
289. Cf. Staszewski, supra note 166, at 862-63 (critiquing the use of majority rule as a
guiding principle for administrative legitimacy).
290. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).

291. Cf. Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 625 (1984) (emphasizing the importance of checks and
balances in administrative government).
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power; 292 they might also offer the sort of "second opinion" often
thought to improve decisionmaking. 293
To be sure, this new vision would face substantial dissent,
particularly from those who lament that the rulemaking process is
already too ossified. 294 A defining feature of a bureaucracy, they might
note, is its ability to act more swiftly than the legislature. Resolving
this debate is well beyond the scope of this Article, but the possible
lines of argument highlight the need for future work to explore and
challenge the disconnect between the normative commitments of
federalism and administrative legitimacy, and to seek points of
convergence.
What we can say for now is that the calls for a greater state
role in the work of federal agencies, and the special role that states
already play in the federal agency decisionmaking process, sit
uneasily with the legitimacy values that have defined administrative
law for the past century.

292. Cf. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 268, at 460 (explaining how states can check executive
power, casting themselves as agents of Congress).

293. See Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions and InstitutionalDesign, 97 VA. L. REV. 1435,
1448-67 (2011) (identifying costs and benefits of second opinions in institutional design).

294. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying"the Rulemaking Process,
41 DuKE L.J. 1385, 1386 (1992) (noting that "many observers from across the political spectrum
agree ... that [ossification] is one of the most serious problems currently facing regulatory
agencies').

